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THE CONUNDRUM OF CLIMATE CHANGE CAUSATION:
USING MARKET SHARE LIABILITY TO SATISFY THE
IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENT IN NATIVE VILLAGE
OF KIVALINA V. EXXONMOBIL CO.
Samantha Lawson*
INTRODUCTION

Change is in the air. Over the past several decades numerous
studies have indicated a general increase in global temperature.' The
U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration ("NASA")
reported that 2005 was the warmest year on record in more than a
century.2 While researchers are unsure if 2010 will surpass 2005 as
the warmest year in the past century,3 they are sure about one thing:
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Fordham University School of Law. B.S., 2007, Colby
College. I would like to thank my faculty advisor, Dean Sheila Foster, for her
guidance throughout the Note-writing process and my family and friends for their
unending support, encouragement, and confidence in me.
1. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, THE SCIENCE

OF CLIMATE CHANGE: SECOND ASSESSMENT REPORT 1995, at 4 (1995) [hereinafter
IPCC, 1995

REPORT];

INTERGOVERNMENTAL

PANEL ON

CLIMATE CHANGE,

CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 SYNTHESIS REPORT, at 30 (2007) [hereinafter IPCC, 2007
SYNTHESIS REPORT]; J. Hansen et al., GISS Surface TemperatureAnalysis-Global
Temperature Trends: 2005 Summation, GODDARD INST. FOR SPACE STUDIES,

NASA, http://data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/2005 (last updated Jan. 12, 2006)
[hereinafter NASA, GISS Surface Temperature Analysis-Global Temperature
Trends].
2. NASA, GISS Surface Temperature Analysis-Global Temperature Trends,
supra note 1.
3. GODDARD INST. FOR SPACE STUDIES, NASA, GISS Surface Temperature

Analysis-2010-How Warm Was This Summer?, http://data.giss.nasa.gov/
gistemp/2010summer/ (last visited April 15, 2011) [hereinafter NASA, How Warm
Was This Summer?] (noting that because the mean temperature of 2010 will likely
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the warmest twelve month Teriod in the Goddard Institute's 131 year
history ended in mid 2010.
In its 2010 report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
("IPCC") demonstrated that the "[w]arming of the climate system is
unequivocal, as is . . . . evident from observations of increases in
global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of
snow and ice and rising global average sea level." 5
The IPCC indicated that the reported increase in global temperature
is largely the result of human activities.6 This proposition, along with
the conclusion that climate change occurs through modification of the
natural greenhouse effect, is not particularly controversial.7 The
greenhouse effect is a natural process whereby greenhouse gases,
such as carbon dioxide (C0 2 ) provide additional warming for earth.
The accumulation of greenhouse gases in the earth's atmosphere
causes already warm, infrared solar radiation, normally released out
of the atmosphere, to be trapped and re-radiated back to earth,
warming the earth's surface. 9 An increased presence of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere results in an increased warming of the
earth. 10
be so close to that of 2005 researchers may not be able to distinguish which year
was the warmest).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 30.
6. See id. at 37 (concluding "[t]here is very high confidence that the global
average net effect of human activities since 1750 has been one of warming"); see
also id at 39 ("Most of the observed increase in global average temperature since
the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic
greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations.").
7. A.B.A, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 5 (Michael B. Gerrard,
ed. 2007); see also JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 123 (3d ed. 2010) (noting the debate over
climate change is not about the power of gases to warm the environment or if the
greenhouse effect is real); Randall S. Abate, Automobile Emissions and Climate
Change Impacts: Employing Public Nuisance Doctrine as Part of a "Global
Warming Solution" in California,40 CONN. L. REV. 591, 593 (2008) (recognizing
that both the Supreme Court and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
recognize that there is a causal connection between greenhouse gases emitted by
human beings and global warming).
8. See A.B.A., supra note 7, at 5; see also SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note
7, at 121.
9. A.B.A., supra note 7, at 5.
10. Id.
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There has been a steady increase in the emission of greenhouse
gases through human activities." This Note focuses on the emission
of CO 2 as it is the most significant anthropogenic greenhouse gas.12
The United States and Canada contribute roughly twenty percent of
all anthropogenic CO 2 .13 The primary CO 2 emitters are fossil fuel
companies, electric utilities, and automobile manufacturers.14
A limited number of companies within these primary-emitterindustries most significantly contribute to CO 2 emissions.1 In 1996,
fifteen companies made up ninety-one percent of the American
gasoline market and ten oil companies dominated over seventy-five
percent of the American oil market.16 In 1997 ten coal producers
contributed sixty-one percent of the American coal market.' 7 Though
there are numerous utility companies in the United States, in 2000, it
was the 100 largest electric generation owners who owned over 1,900
American power plants, produced approximately eighty-seven
percent of America's electricity, and emitted eighty-eight percent of
the CO 2 emissions of the electric power industry.' 8
Currently, there is no federal legislation regarding compensation
for individuals adversely affected by climate change. While the
United States is a member of the U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change as of 1992, it remains one of two chief industrialized
countries not party to the Kyoto Protocol, which began enforcement
in February 2005.19 President George W. Bush rejected the Kyoto
11. IPCC, 2007 SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 1, at 36 (noting that between
1970 and 2004 annual CO 2 emissions have risen by approximately eighty percent).
12. Id. (noting that CO 2 emissions constitute seventy-seven percent of
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions); see also David A. Grossman, Warming
Up to a Not-So-RadicalIdea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1, 7 (2003).
13. IPCC, 2007 SYNTHESIS REPORT, supranote 1, at 36.
14. Grossman, supra note 12, at 28 (noting that in 2000, fossil fuel combustion
was responsible for about ninety-eight percent of total U.S. CO 2 emissions).
15. Id. at 29.
16. Id. at 30.
17. Id.
18. Id. The total number of power plants in the U.S. as of 2000 was 2,776. See
ELECTRICITY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, NUMBER OF PLANTS AT U.S.
ELECTRIC UTILITIES BY CENSUS DIvISION AND STATE, 2000, tbl. El, available at

http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/ipp/htmll/ippvltelpl.html (last modified
Sep. 4, 2002).
19. A.B.A., supra note 7, at 19. The Kyoto Protocol is an international
agreement that sets binding emissions caps on all signing countries. Id. at 18. The
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Protocol on the basis that it would significantly damage the U.S.
economy.20 The Bush Administration sought to persuade emissions
reductions on a voluntary basis.21 Nevertheless, the constant growth
of the U.S. economy and lack of mandatory emissions reduction
plans have allowed U.S. emission levels to continue to rise.2 2
Hundreds of lawsuits have been filed in state and federal court by a
variety of plaintiffs to bridge the gaps in the regulatory response to
the climate change crisis. 23 One category of cases is claims based on
existing statutes. 24 In Massachusetts v. EPA25 the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether agencies, in this case the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") had authority to take
action against CO 2 emissions under the Clean Air Act ("CAA").2 6
The Court held that (1) greenhouse gases are classified as air
pollutants and are thus regulated by the EPA, (2) the EPA is
obligated to issue a finding that emissions from vehicles "may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare[,]" 2 7
i.e. an endangerment finding, and (3) states have a lower standing
threshold than do private parties in the context of climate change
litigation.2 8 The EPA issued an endangerment finding in April 2009,

limitations are expected to be met during a timeline of 2008 to 2012, and reductions
are set based on emissions levels from 1990. Id. The percentage reductions are not
uniform and the U.S. was set to seven percent below its 1990 emissions level. Id.
The goal of the Kyoto Protocol was to reduce emissions, from what they would
have been without reduction efforts, by approximately thirty percent. Id.
20. Id. at 19.
21. Id. (noting that there are "tax incentives for renewable energy and energy
efficiency" in addition to the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and
Climate which provides a framework, on a voluntary basis, for international
development of clean practices); see also, SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at

134.
22. A.B.A., supra note 7, at 19; see also Eduardo M. Pefialver, Acts of God or
Toxic Torts? Applying Tort Principles to the Problem of Climate Change, 38 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 563 (1998) (noting the 1992 U.S. goal to keep emissions at 1990
levels by 2000 remains unmet).
23. See A.B.A., supra note 7, at 21; SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at
134.
24. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
25. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
26. See id
27. Id. at 532-33.
28. See id at 520.
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a significant step toward the regulation of CO 2 from automobiles, but
is yet to regulate emissions levels. 29
This Note focuses on a second category of litigation: civil lawsuits
filed by local governments, environmental groups, private parties,
and states claiming that greenhouse gas emissions are actionable at
common law.3 0 These plaintiffs bring public nuisance claims against
greenhouse gas emitters, such as oil, energy, and utility companies,
for the effects of their contributions to global warming.3 1 They seek
damages and injunctions both to deal with the financial cost of
climate change and to control future damage.32 These cases present
challenges to nearly every element of the traditional tort.
This Note endeavors to provide a framework by which plaintiffs in
climate change nuisance cases may address one of those challenges:
the identification requirement of causation. Part I of this Note
outlines the use of public nuisance as a cause of action, particularly in
the environmental litigation context. Part I examines in detail two
climate change nuisance cases, followed by challenges the plaintiffs
in each case will face in proving causation. Part II describes the
development and application of market share liability ("MSL") from
its inception in the diethystilbesterol ("DES") litigation context. Part
II summarizes the critiques of MSL and the limits on its extension to
other products. Finally, Part III argues that MSL is appropriate for
satisfying the identification requirement of causation, based on policy
and practical concerns in certain climate change public nuisance
cases.

29. Leslie Z. Walker, EPA Issues Proposed Endangerment Finding for
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, ABBOTT & KINDERMAN LAND USE LAW BLOG (Apr.

20, 2009), http://blog.aklandlaw.com/2009/04/articles/climate-change/epa-issuesproposed-endangerment-finding-for-greenhouse-gas-emissions/.
30. See, e.g., Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d
863 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, California v.
General Motors Corp., No. C06-05755, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17,
2007); Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Comer v. Murphy Oil,
U.S.A., No. 1:05 CV-436-LG-RHW (S.D. Miss. Aug 30, 2007), rev'd, 585 F.3d
855 (5th Cir. 2009), panel opinion vacated, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010) (en
banc); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power ("AEP"), 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y.
2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
31. See, supra note 30.
32. AEP, 582 F.3d at 318 (plaintiffs seeking injunctions); Kivalina, 663 F.
Supp. 2d at 868 (plaintiffs seeking only damages).
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Part I of this Note introduces the legal claim of public nuisance and
its elastic application to a wide range of litigation scenarios. Part I
also highlights the element of causation required in any public
nuisance suit, and the difficulties climate change plaintiffs face in
proving causation. Part I.A discusses the history of public nuisance
and the remedies available in public nuisance suits. Part I.B explores
modern public nuisance claims and two different examples of public
nuisance claims in the context of climate change litigation:
Connecticut v. American Electric Power ("AEP"),33 which maps a
traditional public nuisance claim of a state seeking abatement of the
nuisance, and The Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Co.,34
which traces an alternative nuisance claim seeking monetary damages
as a remedy. Finally, Part I.C highlights the three hurdles plaintiffs
face in proving causation in nuisance cases in the climate change
context: general causation, specific causation, and the identification
requirement of causation.
A. History ofPublic Nuisance
Dean William Prosser and Dean W. Page Keeton have noted,
"[t]here is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than
that which surrounds the word 'nuisance."' 35 The elastic boundaries
of nuisance mean it has been used by a variety of plaintiffs and
applied to a vast array of circumstances. 36 This amorphous and allencompassing reputation places nuisance well within the notion that
certain aspects of the law of torts should morph alongside changed
circumstances. 37
Public nuisance originated around the thirteenth century as a
criminal action brought by the government against interferences with
the general public's right to the enjoyment of land.38 The right to
bring a public nuisance claim traditionally derived from the
33. 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
34. 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
35. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, §
86 (5th ed. 1984).

36. See id
37. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 390 (1916).
38. J.R. Spencer, Public Nuisance - A CriticalExamination, 48 CAMBRIDGE L.
J. 55, 58-59 (1989).

2011]

CLIMATE CHANGE AND MARKET SHARE LIABILITY

439

sovereign's police power, not from tort law, 39 thus public nuisance
was remedied by criminal sentencing, often coupled with
injunctions. 40
In the sixteenth century, English courts crafted an exception to the
rule that only criminal actions arose from public nuisance. 4 1 The
logic behind the old rule was that if civil actions were available for
public nuisance, the defendant's liability would be too great because
every member of the public would have an action.4 2 To account for
this concern courts fashioned a rule whereby a plaintiff can bring a
public nuisance civil action "if he has suffered 'special damage' as a
result" of the nuisance. 43 Though the meaning of special damage
within public nuisance was "obscure," 44 scholars note that the kind of
damage "clearly includes personal injury and physical damage to
.

property and . . .. purely economic losses ....
B. Modern Public Nuisance Claims

Most courts in modern public nuisance claims have followed the
46
Restatement's definition of public nuisance. The Restatement states
that a public nuisance is any "unreasonable interference with a right
common to the general public."4 7 The Restatement follows the
special damages rule in its outline for who can recover for public
nuisance. To recover damages, plaintiffs must prove that they "have
suffered harm of a kind different from that" experienced by the
general public. 48
39. Id.
40. Id. at 66.
41. Id. at 73; see also Abate, supra note 7, at 599 (citing the sixteenth century as
the time when courts recognized public nuisance claims); Robert Abrams, The
Misunderstood Law of Public Nuisance: A Comparison with Private Nuisance
Twenty Years After Boomer, 54 ALB. L. REV. 359, 362 (1990) (noting that the
change in law allowed "private citizens to bring an action .. . for public nuisance").
42. Spencer, supra note 38, at 73.
43. Id. at 74.
44. Id.
45. Id.; see also id. at n. 85-88.
46. Connecticut v. AEP, 582 F.3d 309, 350 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Grossman,
supra note 12, at 53.
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §821(B)(1) (1979).
48. Id. § 821(C); see also Abate, supra note 7, at 601 & n. 79 (noting the
"different in kind" harm requirement may be waived in the case of abnormally
dangerous activity such as disposing hazardous waste).
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1. Modem Remedies for Public Nuisance: Damages v. Injunctions
As noted above, in public nuisance actions plaintiffs can seek: (1)
an injunction to enjoin the injurious party from continuing its harmful
activities, and/or (2) monetary damages. 49 In an effort to rein in the
50
the doctrine is limited by an
broad definition of nuisance,
5
unreasonableness standard. ' Therefore, conduct is unreasonable
"only if the gravity of the harm caused outweighs the utility of the

conduct." 52
In circumstances where plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, the
plaintiff must prove that defendant's harmful activity is unreasonable,
i.e., the social benefit of such activity is not greater than the harm
caused.53 This is logical because an injunction would cease the
activity altogether, affecting third parties.54 Accordingly, in seeking
an injunction, the plaintiff must show the social benefit of such
activity is not greater than the harm caused.
This evaluation is different from that used when deciding to award
damages for a nuisance. 56 Prosser and Keeton note that there must be
a distinction between "enterprises . . . . of such social value" that

justifies their continuance, and those enterprises that the public would
49. KEETON ET AL., supra note 35, § 88(A), at 631; see also Abate, supra note
7, at 601 (recognizing an injunction, damages, or both, as the remedies for public
nuisance claims).
50. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 47 and accompanying
text.

51. KEETON ET AL., supra note 35, § 88(A), at 631.
52. Id. at 630-31 (noting that this test is assessed by a reasonable person
standard, even if the benefits outweigh the harm but there is a "feasible way,
economically and scientifically" to eliminate a significant portion of the harm
without negatively impacting the benefits).

53. Id.; see generally Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y.
1970) aff'd sub nom. Kinley v. Atlantic Cement Co., 42 A.D.2d 496 (1973); see
also Abate, supra note 7, at 601-02 (highlighting the difference between awarding
damages and an injunction-damages are awarded when "the harm caused is
significant and unreasonable despite the utility of the actor's conduct" and an
injunction is available "when the actor's conduct is so unreasonable that it must
cease").
54. Abate, supra note 7, at 601-02.
55. KEETON ET AL., supra note 35, § 88(A), at 631.
56. See id. (noting the requirement of unreasonable as different for plaintiffs
seeking injunctive relief from those seeking damages); Abate, supra note 7, at 60102 (same).
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be better off without.5 7 Plaintiffs harmed by enterprises of "social
value" should be made whole through damages, while injunctions
should be imposed on the latter enterprises. 58 The court will often
choose to award damages where plaintiffs can be fully compensated,
rather than enjoin lawful activity. 59
2. Public Nuisance in the Environmental Litigation Context
Public nuisance's use in environmental litigation is an example of
the flexibility of the doctrine in allowing non-traditional causes of
action. 60 The plaintiffs identification of damage to a public right is
necessary for the success of a public nuisance claim. 6 1 The use and
enjoyment of the environment is just such a public right. 6 2 With this
principle, plaintiffs have used public nuisance claims to combat air
pollution,
hazardous waste disposal,64 and excessive noise.
Environmental public nuisance suits may be preempted by federal
57. KEETON ET AL., supra note 35, § 88(A), at 631.
58. See id.; see also Salem Iron Co. v. Hyland, 77 N.E. 751, 752 (Ohio 1906)
(holding plaintiffs cannot prevail on a suit for an injunction against lawful business
operated with care, but can obtain a damages award); Berkey v. Berwind-White
Coal Mining Co., 69 A. 329 (Pa. 1908) (same); W. Page Keeton & Clarence
Morris, Notes on Balancing the Equities, 18 TEX. L. REV. 412, 418 (1940).
59. See Baldwin v. McClendon, 288 So.2d 761, 767 (Ala. 1974) (holding
defendants' compensation for the depreciation in the market value of plaintiffs'
property, resulting from defendants' operation of a hog production plant, was
sufficient not to enjoin production).
60. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
61. Abate, supra note 7, at 600.
62. Grossman, supra note 12, at 53 (noting that pollution can harm an
environment that affects all members of that community and thus the public right of
that community).
63. See generally Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907). The
Supreme Court granted an injunction to the State of Georgia when it initiated a
public nuisance case in the context of interstate air pollution. Id. at 239. Georgia
sued Tennessee Copper Company for its emissions of sulfur dioxide into the air,
which harmed the crops and environment in Georgia. Id. at 236-38. But see Abate,
supra note 7, at 606 (noting that "public nuisance air pollution claims have not
been as successful since Congress's enactment of the [CAA]").
64. See, e.g., Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244, 1248 (R.I. 1982) (holding that a
chemical dump site that caused harm to neighbors and had the potential for harm to
the general public was a public and private nuisance).
65. See, e.g., New York v. Waterloo Stock Car Raceway, Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d 40
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (finding a public nuisance in a raceway because of the danger,
noise and dust it produced).
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litigation where Congress has specifically addressed the issue to be
litigated.6 6
3. Public Nuisance Claims in the Climate Change Litigation Context
Scholars disagree about whether the environmental nuisance cases
establish a federal common-law foundation for climate change public
nuisance cases.67
a. Connecticut v. AEP 68

The AEP case represents the traditional public nuisance claim:
government actors seeking injunctive relief against defendants for
their nuisance affecting a right common to the general public. 69
i. Facts
In July 2004, eight states7o and three land trusts 7 1 filed a complaint
against six energy companies 72 in the Southern District of New
York.73 The plaintiffs represented upwards of seventy-seven million
environments. 74
people in their common
The states "sought abatement of defendants' ongoing contributions
to a public nuisance under federal common law, or in the alternative,
under state law."75 The states contended that the defendants
66. The Clean Water Act ("CWA") is now the basis for denying public nuisance
claims in water pollution cases. See Abate, supra note 7, at 604; see also Middlesex
Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (holding
that statute had preempted the federal common law of nuisance in the context of
ocean pollution); see also supra note 63.
67. Compare Abate, supra note 7, at 607, with Connecticut v. AEP, 406 F.
Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated,582 F.3d 309, 316 (2d Cir. 2009).
68. 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
69. See infra Part I.B.3.a.i.
70. California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Wisconsin, along with the City of New York. 582 F.3d at 316.
71. The Open Space Institute, the Open Space Conservancy, and the Audubon
Society of New Hampshire. Id. at 318.
72. American Electric Power Company, American Electric Power Service
Corporation, the Southern Company, Tennessee Valley Authority, Xcel Energy
Corporation, and Cinergy Corporation. Id. at 316.
73. 406 F. Supp. 2d at 267.
74. Id. at 268.
75. 582 F.3d at 316 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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contribute about one quarter of the U.S. electric power sector's CO 2
emissions and roughly ten percent of all anthropogenic CO 2
emissions worldwide. 7 6 Accordingly, they argued, defendants were
"substantial contributors" to global warming and raised
anthropogenic CO 2 levels. 7 7
The complaint cited environmental reports from the [PCC and the
U.S. National Academy of Sciences to support its discussion of the
causal link between increased greenhouse gas emissions and global
warming. 78 The states alleged that the changes in the Earth's climate
will have negative impacts on their "environments, residents[,] and
property," costing the states billions of dollars to correct. 79 The
complaint outlined the current and future injuries that result from
global warming and defendants' increased CO 2 emissions. 80 The
range of future injuries was vaster than those characterized as current
81
injuries.
The states sought equitable relief from defendants whom they
sought to hold jointly and severally liable for their public nuisance. 82
They sought "to abate that nuisance" through CO 2 emissions caps and

reductions.83
The Land Trusts' complaint was largely the same as the states'
complaint. 84 The significant difference was that, regarding the
property they held in trust, the Land Trusts alleged special injuries
different in degree and kind from injuries to the general public
resulting from global warming.
Defendants moved to dismiss both complaints on the grounds that:

76. Id.

77. Id.
78. Id. at 317.

79. Id.
80. Id. at 317-18.
81. Id. (including current injuries such as a reduction in California's mountain
snowpack, warmer temperatures on average, earlier spring thaws and later fall
freezes, decrease in average snowfall, and future injuries such as increased illnesses
and deaths due to harm to the biodiversity of the states).
82. Id. at 318.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 319.
85. Id.
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Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted because: (1) there is no recognized federal
common law cause of action to abate greenhouse gas
emissions ... (2) separation of powers principles preclude
[the courts] from adjudicating the[] actions . . . and (3)

Congress has displaced any federal common law cause of
action to address the issue of global warming. 86
[Defendants also claimed the district court] lack[ed]
jurisdiction to resolve [the] claims because: (1) Plaintiffs do
not have standing to sue on account of global warming and
(2) Plaintiffs[] fail[] to state a claim under federal
law.... 8 7
The district court found that the complaints presented a political
question in seeking CO 2 emissions caps and dismissed them.8 8
Following the district court's dismissal, plaintiffs appealed. 89 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the district court
erred in its dismissal based on the existence of a political question.90
The Second Circuit addressed defendants' other objections, finding
that plaintiffs had parenspatriae standing 91 and proprietary standing
to bring their public nuisance claim. 92 The Second Circuit also held
that plaintiffs had stated a legitimate claim under the federal common
law of nuisance. 93 Finally, the Second Circuit held that the CAA had
not preempted a federal common law of nuisance claim because the
EPA had yet to regulate greenhouse gas emissions such that the
regulation "speaks directly" to the issues raised by plaintiffs. 94 The
86. Connecticut v. AEP, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
87. Id.
88. See id. at 272 (noting that in air pollution cases the Supreme Court has
required courts to balance environmental interests, economic interests, and social
costs, and that the court cannot balance those interests without an "initial policy
determination" by the government regarding the interests).
89. Connecticut v. AEP, 582 F.3d 309, 314 (2d Cir. 2009).
90. Id. at 315.
91. Id. at 334-39 (noting "[flor over a century, states have been accorded
standing in common law nuisance causes of action when suing as parenspatriae").
92. Id. at 349.
93. Id. at 353, 371.
94. Id. at 387-88 (noting that Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304 (1981), was
distinguishable because the CWA was so comprehensive that it left no place for
common law nuisance claims in the context of water pollution).
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Second Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court and
remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion. 95 Defendants
petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court. 96
ii. The Current Status of AEP
On December 6, 2010 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in AEP
v. Connecticut.97 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on all
questions presented by defendants: (1) whether states and private
parties have standing to seek judicially-fashioned emissions caps on
utilities for their contribution to climate change, (2) whether a cause
of action to cap carbon dioxide emissions can be implied under
federal common law, and (3) whether an injunction aiming to cap
defendants' CO 2 emissions constitutes a political question better
suited for the legislature, i.e. whether it requires initial policy
determinations. 9 8 The Court is set to hear the case in the Spring 2011
term. 99
b. Native Village ofKivalina v. ExxonMobil Co. 00
Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Co., represents a second,
nontraditional, public nuisance claim brought by a government
plaintiff seeking only monetary damages for the nuisance.
i. Facts
In 2008, the city of Kivalina and the Native Village of Kivalina
(the governing body of about 400 Inupiat Eskimo inhabitants)
brought a federal common law nuisance claim, or in the alternative
state law claims, against twenty-four oil, energy and utility
95. Id. at 393.
96. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Connecticut v. AEP, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir.
2009) (No. 10-174), 2010 WL 3054374.
97. Connecticut v. AEP, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 79
U.S.L.W. 3092, 79 U.S.L.W. 3339, 79 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. 2010) (No. 10-174).
98. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Connecticut v. AEP, 582 F.3d 309 (2d
Cir. 2009) (No. 10-174), 2010 WL 3054374 (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
99. Connecticut v. AEP, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 79
U.S.L.W. 3092, 79 U.S.L.W. 3339, 79 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10174).
100. 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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companies. 01 The plaintiffs alleged that defendants' contribution to
global warming through their activities in the oil, energy, and utilities
fields caused their harm. 102
Kivalina is situated on the end of a six-mile barrier reef between
the Chukchi Sea and the Kivalina and Wulik Rivers.' 03 The village is
located seventy miles north of the Arctic Circle on Alaska's
Northwest coast. 104 Arctic sea ice, specifically the "land-fast sea ice,"
abundant in the fall, winter, and spring, has protected the Kivalina
coast for centuries.1 05 The ice acts as a barrier against the storms that
pummel the very area upon which Kivalina is situated. 10 6 Plaintiffs
allege that increased annual temperatures, resulting from global
warming, have negatively affected the "thickness, extent, and
duration of sea ice" that protects Kivalina's coast. 10 7 The reduction of
the sea ice has left Kivalina vulnerable to "waves, storm surges[,] and
erosion."1os As a result of the increased battery by coastal storms,
Kivalina's residents are now forced to relocate or risk the annihilation
of their village.109 The plaintiffs seek the costs of their relocation.110
That Kivalina's inhabitants must relocate is a fact, corroborated by
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (ACE), Alaska District in April,

101. Id. at 869. Defendants were BP Entities, Chevron Entities, Conoco Phillips,
ExxonMobil Corporation, Shell Entities, Peabody Energy Corporation, AES
Corporation, the American Electric Power Corporation, DTE Energy Company,
Duke Entities, Dynegy Entities, Edison International, MidAmerican, Mirant, NRG
Energy, Pinnacle West, Reliant, The Southern Company, Xcel Energy. Complaint,
Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., No. CV-08-01138 SBA (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 26, 2008),
1, 18-122 [hereinafter Complaint]. These defendants as a
group represent "some of the most profitable corporations in the world." Douglas
Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law 28 (Yale Law. Sch.
Research Paper No. 215), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1645871.
The complaint also claims civil conspiracy and concert of action, but those
allegations are not relevant to this Note, so will not be addressed. Id. 12.
102. Complaint, supra note 101, at 1.
103. Id. 1.
104. Id.
105. Id. 4, 16.
106. Id. 16.
107. Id. 185.
108. Id. (noting that "[s]torms now routinely batter Kivalina and are destroying
its property . . .
109. Id.
110. Id.
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2006.1 The U.S. Government Accountability Office ("GAO")
reported in December 2003 that: "[I]t is believed that the right
combination of storm events could flood the entire village at any time
[and r]emaining on the island.. . . is no longer a viable option for the
community."112 The ACE and the GAO estimate that it would cost

between ninety-five and 125 million dollars and 100 and 400 million
dollars, respectively, to relocate the village." 3 While plaintiffs
concede that global warming injures the public at large, they argue
that they suffer special injuries unique "in degree and kind from
injuries to the general public."ll 4
Plaintiffs are "discrete and identifiable entities that have
contributed little or nothing to global warming."" 5 Defendants,
categorized into oil, power, and coal production companies, have all
emitted significant amounts of greenhouse gases, specifically CO 2,
and thus contributed to global warming and the Kivalina's harm. 11 6
ii. The Current Status of Kivalina
The district court held that Plaintiffs' federal common law claim of
nuisance was barred as a political question and for lack of standing
under Article III.1 Plaintiffs have subsequently appealed.'
111. Id. (citing U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, ALASKA DIST., Alaska Village
Erosion Technical Assistance Program:An Examination of Erosion Issues in the
Communities of Bethel, Dillingham, Kaktovik, Kivalina, Newtok, Shishmaref and
Unalakleet, 23 (Apr. 2006) (noting in their report that as a result of "global climate
change .

. .

. the Chukchi Sea is less likely to be frozen when damaging winter

storms occur. [This has] resulted in significant erosion that is now threatening
[entities in the village]")).
112. Id.

113. Id. 1186.
114. Id. 185.
115. Id. 188; see also Kysar, supra note 101, at 28 (noting that the plaintiffs in
Kivalina are "sympathetic" and are "among the most vulnerable people in the world
to climate change while also being among the least responsible for it").
116. See id. TT 18-122. Plaintiffs concede that the transportation sector is to
blame for significant greenhouse gas emissions, but have not joined members of
this sector in their claims. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F.
Supp. 2d 863, 877 n. 4 (N.D. Cal 2009).
117. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 882.
118. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,
No. 09-17490 at 1 (March 10, 2010) (noting that Plaintiffs filed Notice of Appeal
on November 9, 2009), availableat http://www.pawalaw.com/assets/docs/kivalina9th-circuit-appellants-brief.pdf.
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C. The CausationElement in Climate Change Nuisance Claims
As discussed below, causation presents a challenging task in
climate change litigation. Nevertheless, this Note endeavors to
provide a possible framework through which plaintiffs may be able to
prove one element of causation.
Part I.B.3 examined two different types of climate change nuisance
cases and the different bars defendants raised to prevent adjudication
of the merits, such as political question and standing. This section
looks at the element of causation, which plaintiffs must prove to
succeed on the merits of any public nuisance claim. As discussed
below, causation presents a challenging task in climate change
litigation, but this Note endeavors to provide a possible framework
through which plaintiffs may be able to prove one element of
causation.
While the AEP and Kivalina cases represent two different types of
nuisance claims, both groups of plaintiffs will face the same
challenges in proving causation. In fact, in dismissing the claims on
grounds other than causation, the courts have expressed doubt that a
causal nexus in climate change cases can be established.11 The ideal
tort causation situation exists when one party is proved to be the
direct and sole cause of harm to another party. 120 Many harms in the
modem world do not reflect this simplistic view of causation in
tort, 12 1 and thus the law has had to adapt. Toxic torts, personal injury
lawsuits in which chemicals or faulty drugs cause many plaintiff
injuries, presented significant problems with traditional causation
requirements. 122
In toxic tort cases, plaintiffs face two hurdles in proving causation:
(1) establishing general causation or "whether the alleged causal
factor can cause the type of effect from which the victim suffers[;]" 1 23
119. See Christopher R. Reeves, Climate Change on Trial: Making the Case For
Causation,32 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 495, 507 (2009) (noting that courts have taken
"significant efforts" in expressing concern about the issues of causation and
damages in climate change litigation).
120. See Kysar, supra note 101, at 62.
121. Kysar, supra note 101, at 62 (noting complications arising from "not one
action or series of actions by a single actor, but rather a confluence of multiple
actions by multiple actors").
122. Pefialver, supra note 22, at 579-80.
123. Id. (emphasis added); see also Kirsten H. Engel, Harmonizing Regulatory
and Litigation Approaches to Climate Change Mitigation: Incorporating Tradable
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and (2) establishing individual/specific causation or whether the
alleged causal factor did indeed cause a particular victim's
injury...."124 Problems such as long time lapses between exposure
and harm, the existence of other possible causes of the harm, and the
possibility of exposure not leading to development of the harm,
plague plaintiffs in proving causation, particularly specific causation,
in toxic torts. 125 Plaintiffs bringing climate change litigation will be
required to establish general1 26 and specific causation, 127 and will
suffer from many of the problems faced by plaintiffs in toxic tort
cases.128 This Note presumes that plaintiffs have surpassed these first
two hurdles and the litigation has reached the final causal hurdle
presented.
A third causal hurdle that plaintiffs face in the climate change
context, which is relevant to this Note, is related to specific causation.
The so-called identification requirement answers the questions of
whether a particular defendant's activities caused the harm suffered
Emissions Offsets into Common Law Remedies, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1563, 1586-87
(2007) (recognizing two inquiries in questions of causation); Reeves, supra note
119, at 509 (recognizing the necessity of proving general causation in tort cases).
124. Pefialver, supra note 22, at 579 (emphasis added); see also Engel, supra
note 123, at 1586, n.70 (recognizing the necessity of proving the "legal cause" or
specific cause of a harm in addition to the general cause); Reeves, supra note 119,
at 509 (same); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases:
A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REv. 849, 856-57
(discussing the difficulties with proving specific causation in mass exposure cases).
125. Pefialver, supra note 22, at 580.
126. In climate change litigation, plaintiffs must first show that anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions are capable of causing climate change, which they
should have little difficulty meeting. See A.B.A., supra note 7, at 200 ("[I]t may be
possible to prove [general] causation."); Engel, supra note 123, at 1586 & n.71
("[A] plaintiff should not have trouble meeting the [general causation]
requirement.").
127. Proving specific causation seems to be more problematic for plaintiffs in the
climate change litigation context than general causation. In the climate change
context the harm most likely will be the result of an intensified climatic behavior
that exists independent of defendant's actions. This is distinct from toxic torts
where the harm is usually a "signature disease", caused solely by defendants'
activity. The fact that the climate is affected by a variety of factors makes scientific
measurement of the percentage of climate change influenced by greenhouse gas
emissions difficult. A.B.A., supra note 7, at 200-01; Pefialver, supra note 22, at
581 (noting that climate change plaintiffs' injuries are the result of "shifts in
climatic activity," not inception of new types of issues).
128. See A.B.A., supra note 7, at 200; Pefialver, supra note 22, at 579.
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by plaintiffs. 129 This hurdle becomes a challenge when a plaintiff
cannot specifically identify the defendant who has harmed her. 130
The identification requirement serves two of the important
functions of tort law: compensating victims and protecting people
from excess liability. 131 First, tort law seeks to rectify harms to
plaintiffs where defendants can be identified as having caused the
harm.132 But, protecting manufacturers from excessive liability is
connected with the goal of compensating victims.1 33 In order to
encourage socially desirable activity, there must be a limit to
manufacturer liability for victim compensation.1 34 Requiring
defendant identification limits any manufacturer's potential liability
to the harms they themselves have caused.135 A plaintiffs failure to
meet the identification requirement has traditionally resulted in a
dismissal of the case.1 36
Fulfilling the identification requirement in climate change litigation
is unachievable. Because there are a large number of greenhouse gas
emitters and it is impossible to trace each emitter's contribution to the
plaintiffs harm, identifying that a particular named defendant's
emission directly harmed plaintiff, and thus satisfying the
identification requirement in a traditional way is out of the
question. 137
Scholars have not extensively considered the identification
requirement, as most focus on the trouble with specific causation

129. See David M. Schultz, Market Share Liability in DES Cases: The
UnwarrantedErosion of Causation in Fact, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 771, 778 (1991).
130. Id. at 778-82 & n.56.
131. Schultz, supra note 129, at 779.
132. See id; see also Williams v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 285 S.W.2d 53, 56-57
(Mo. App. 1955) (holding that a plaintiff who failed to prove defendant bottle
manufacturer in fact manufactured the defective bottle causing her injury did not
satisfy her burden).
133. See Schultz, supra note 129, at 779.
134. See id. (noting that to achieve the right balance between compensation and
excessive liability the plaintiff must identify the defendant that caused her harm).
135. Id.
136. Jonathan B. Newcomb, Market Share Liabilityfor Defective Products: An
Ill-Advised Remedy for the Problem of Identification, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 300, 301
(1982).
137. See supra notes 8-10, 14 and accompanying text.
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alone. 138 Nevertheless, this Note proposes that plaintiffs can
overcome the hurdle of the identification requirement through MSL.
Having examined the difficulties inherent in proving the
identification requirement in climate change litigation, this Note will
now consider the theory of MSL and its viability as a substitute for
the identification requirement.
II. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION: MARKET SHARE LIABILITY

Part II of this Note introduces a possible tool climate change
plaintiffs may use to overcome the identification requirement: MSL.
In order to understand the application of MSL to climate change
litigation, Part II.A first describes the context for the development of
MSL and how it helps overcome the causation problem presented in
diethystilbesterol ("DES") litigation. Next, Part II.B describes the
theories used to develop MSL, highlighting the distinctions between
other alternative liability frameworks and MSL. Part II.C describes
13 9
Part II.D
the application of MSL in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.
introduces the important questions the Sindell court did not answer.
Next, Part II.E summarizes the critiques of and commentary on MSL
in the DES context. Part II.F considers the subsequent application of
MSL to other products and how the MSL's requirements significantly
limit the scope of its application, a fact that helps the case for its
application to climate change litigation in Kivalina. Finally, Part II.G
discusses the limited scholarship addressing MSL in climate change
nuisance claims.
A. The Context ofDES Litigation

DES litigation presented an extremely complicated causation
problem analogous to identification problems facing climate change
plaintiffs. Between 1938 and 1971 U.S. physicians prescribed DES, a
synthetic composite of estrogen, to women to prevent miscarriage

138. See supra notes 127-130 and accompanying text. But see Daniel J. Grimm,
Note, Global Warming and Market Share Liability: A Proposed Model for
Allocating Tort Damages Among CO 2 Producers, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 209,
216-17 (2007) (proposing a framework by which market share liability ("MSL")
could impose liability in climate change litigation).
139. 607 P.2d 924, 928, 931, 933 (Cal. 1980).
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and avoid pre-term births. 140 In 1971, the FDA classified DES as a
cause of Clear Cell Adenocarcinoma ("CCA"), and several other
cancerous and precancerous vaginal and cervical growths in females
whose exposure to the drug occurred in the womb. 14 1
In the 1970s and 1980s DES victims sued various drug company
manufacturers seeking damages for their injuries.142 CCA has a
minimum latent period of ten or twelve years before its effects are
manifested, but the time lapse can be much longer.143 DES daughters
were faced with significant problems in identifying the particular
manufacturer that had caused their harm: (1) DES daughters had not
ingested DES themselves, (2) the effects of DES were latent, and (3)
there were numerous DES manufacturers contributing to the drug's
market. 144
These unique circumstances forced the courts to consider
alternatives to the plaintiffs' burden of proof of causation in fact and
led to the development of MSL.
B. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories: The Theory ofMarket Share
Liability
Sindell pioneered the application of MSL to DES cases. Prior to
Sindell, courts considering DES cases had held in favor of defendants
on the grounds that plaintiffs could not identify the exact
manufacturer of the DES.145 The court in Sindell was tasked with
determining if the obstacle of causation in fact could be overcome in

the DES context.14 6

140. See About DES: DES History, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
http://www.cdc.gov/des/consumers/about/history.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2011)
[hereinafter CDC, DES History].
141. See id.
142. See id.; see generally Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So.2d 275 (Fla. 1991);
Smith v. Eli Lilly Co., 560 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1990); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73
N.Y.2d 487 (N.Y. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989); Kaufman v. Lilly &
Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449 (N.Y. 1985); Bichler v. Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571 (N.Y.
1982); Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984).
143. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 925.
144. See id.

145. See, e.g., McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 82-84 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1978).
146. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 925 ("[M]ay a plaintiff, injured as the result of a drug
administered to her mother during pregnancy, who knows the type of drug involved
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Sindell brought several causes of action against eleven drug
companies in a class action.14 7 The second cause of action, the one of
interest in this Note, alleged that the specific type of DES ingested is
immaterial and all defendants are jointly liable because "DES was
produced from a common and mutually agreed upon formula as a
fungible drug interchangeable with other brands of the same

product."l 4 8
The lower court dismissed Sindell's action on the grounds that she
was unable to identify the exact manufacturer of the DES that caused
her harm.149 On appeal, the court reversed the lower court, holding
that defendants would be liable to plaintiff for the effects of their
identical products as long as they manufactured a "substantial
percentage" of the DES market.150
In its opinion the California Supreme Court considered three
exceptions to the identification requirement: concert of action
theory,15' alternative liability, and enterprise liability.
1. Alternative Liability
In Summers v. Ticel 52 the California Supreme Court established an
exception to the causation in fact requirement: alternative liability.'5 3
In Summers, two hunters fired their guns in the general direction of
plaintiff who was injured by only one of them.' 54 Relying on Ybarra

but cannot identify the manufacturer . . . . hold liable for her injuries a maker of a
drug produced from an identical formula?").
147. Id. at 926.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 937-38; see also Andrew R. Klein, Causation and Uncertainty:
Making Connections in a Time of Change, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 5, 16 (2008) (citing
the holding in Sindell).
151. The civil theory of concert of action arose from the criminal law notion of
aiding and abetting. See Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp 1004, 1015 (D.S.C.
1981); Newcomb, supra note 136, at 312. Concert of action holds defendants
jointly and severally liable if they act "together or pursuant to a common plan to
knowingly commit or encourage the commission of a tortious act." Id. As concert
of action is inapplicable to the climate change context this Note declines further
elaboration on the theory.
152. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
153. See generally id.
154. Id. at 1-2.
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v. Spangard,'" the court held that both hunters were negligent toward
the plaintiff and the plaintiff had an impossible burden of proof in
discerning which hunter was responsible in fact for his injury. 5 6
Accordingly, the court held both parties jointly and severally liable
and transferred the burden to defendants to prove they were not
responsible.15 7 The court justified this burden shift based largely on
the fact that one of the two hunters was responsible for the injury,1
i.e. there was a fifty percent chance that one hunter was the cause,
and without the shift of the burden, the hunters would be silent, and
the plaintiff would not recover.159 If defendants are unable to absolve
themselves they will be jointly and severally liable without proof of
causation in fact.' 60
2. Enterprise Liability
Another proposed theory that relaxes the causation in fact
requirement and has led to the development of MSL is enterprise or
industry-wide liability. The Eastern District of New York
promulgated this theory in Hall v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.161
In Hall,plaintiffs were injured in separate occasions in separate states
by blasting caps which could have come from a national market of
six manufacturers, or, less likely, from one of a number of Canadian
manufacturers. 16 2
The court reasoned that because there was cooperation within the
industry in the design and manufacture of the caps and that all
defendants had abided by the industry norm, the defendants jointly

155. 154 P.2d 687, 691 (Cal. 1944) (an inference of medical professionals'
negligence could be drawn under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur when plaintiff
was injured during a surgical procedure while he was unconscious and the
professionals were in control of the harm inducing instruments); see also
Newcomb, supra note 136, at 307-11 (explaining the development of alternative
liability from the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur).
156. Summers, 199 P.2d at 4.
157. Id. at 5.
158. See id. at 3.
159. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1074 (N.Y. 1989). Applying
alternative liability, defendants are forced to speak and reveal the culpable party.
Id.
160. See id at 1084.
161. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
162. Id. at 359, 379.
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had control of the risk of the blasting caps.163 Accordingly, the
burden of proof of causation in fact would shift to defendants if
plaintiffs could prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
caps that caused their injury were manufactured by one of the

defendants.164
C. Sindell's Application of Market Share Liability

While the court found the reasoning of alternative liability
advanced in Summers v. Tice most persuasive, it rejected all three of
these theories in the context of DES manufacturer liability, and chose
to adopt MSL instead.16 5 As a preliminary matter, the court
recognized that we live in a complex industrial society where
fungible goods are placed on the market, which can cause injury to
consumers, and where the injuries are impossible to attribute to any
individual manufacturer.166 Fungibility of product constituted the
first requirement for application of MSL.
Next, the court relied on three policy justifications for modifying
the traditional tort rules: (1) a creation of risk to innocent victims, (2)
the superior position of defendats to absorb the costs of the harm,
and (3) the better position of the manufacturer to guard against
defects.1 67

163. Id. at 374.
164. Id. The court recognized that industry-wide liability is appropriate when
applied to an industry with a small number of manufacturers, but may not be
reasonable in a decentralized industry with many producers. Id. at 378. This
explains why enterprise liability should not be applied in climate change cases.
165. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 928-38. The court reasoned that Hall had cautioned
against applying enterprise/industry-wide liability to industries with a large amount
of manufacturers. Additionally, the court found Hall inapplicable because the DES
manufacturers had not delegated safety functions to trade associations and therefore
they did not control the risk to the same degree as defendants in Hall. Finally the
court found it significant that the federal government, through the FDA, regulates
the drug industry closely. The court held that it would be "unfair to impose upon a
manufacturer liability for injuries resulting from the use of a drug which it did not
supply simply because it followed the standards of the industry." Id. at 935; see
also Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 289 N.W.2d 20, 26-27 (Mich. 1979) (relying on
alternative liability and concert of action theories in finding plaintiffs had stated a
cause of action, despite being unable to isolate the specific manufacturer).
166. Sindell, 607 P.3d at 936.
167. Id.
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The court held that where there is a fungible product, the specific
producer of which is impossible to ascertain, and the plaintiff is not at
fault for being unable to produce evidence of causation, liability
based on the percentage of the product defendant sold on the market
for the purpose of miscarriage prevention was appropriate.168
The court added that a manufacturer must contribute a "substantial
percentage" of the market, which the court did not define, to be
joined in liability; therefore, "each defendant will be held liable for
the proportion of the judgment represented by its share of that
market."1 69 Sindell allowed defendants an opportunity to prove that
they could not have produced the DES that caused plaintiffs' injury,
and thus, exculpate them from liability. 170 The court held that the
determination of market share, and therefore the determination of
monetary damages, does not have to be determined "with
mathematical exactitude."171 Rather, it is up to the jury to assign
liability to the best of their ability.172
D. Questions Left Open By Sindell
Sindell left several questions opqn for subsequent courts to grapple
with when attempting to apply MSL in the DES context. Other
courts applying MSL have filled in some of the holes left by Sindell,

168. Id. at 936-37; see also Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating GeneralCausation:
Notes Towards a New Theory ofJustice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2117,
2121 & n. 16 (1997) (recognizing that the strong statistical association between
exposure to DES and the harm suffered, made exposure, sufficient to prove
causation).
169. Sindell, 607 P.3d at 937.
170. Id. A defendant can exculpate themselves from liability by proving they did
not produce DES during the years plaintiffs mother took the drug, or that the drug
had some discernable physical feature that plaintiffs mother does not assign to the
DES she ingested, etc. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. The court dismissed defendants' claims that holding manufacturers
liable for injury, without proof that they were the cause in fact of plaintiffs
injuries, is against public policy and unfair. The court reasoned that defendant's
arguments rested on the assumption that only one producer would be responsible
for the whole industry. MSL eliminates this concern as it holds producers liable
only for their contribution to the market, and thus the injury caused by that
contribution. Id. at 938.
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such as the questions of whether joint and several liability applies,
what market to use, and whether MSL can be applied to other
products.
173

1. Joint and Several Liability
In Sindell, the court did not address whether liability among
defendants would be joint and several, as in Summers v. Tice,174
allowing the plaintiff to recover one hundred percent of her damages.
75
the court modified the Sindell
In Martin v. Abbott Laboratories,1
approach in fashioning a market-share alternate theory of liability. 176
Among other modifications, the court in Martin held that members of
the relevant market are presumed to hold equal shares in the market,
but that defendants can establish their actual market share.1 77 The
presumed market share of defendants unable to exculpate themselves
is adjusted to ensure one hundred percent of the market is covered.17 8
The court felt this was just because all the manufacturers in the DES
industry contributed to the public risk and therefore "each defendant
share[d] in some measure a degree of culpability in producing or

marketing DES."l 79

173. See, e.g., McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265, 270-71 (D.S.D.
1983); Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So.2d 275, 280 n.6, 284 (Fla. 1991);
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1076-77 (N.Y. 1989); Martin v.
Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 380-82 (Wash. 1984).
174. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
175. 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984).
176. Id. at 381.
177. Id. at 383; see, e.g., McCormack v. Abbott Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1521, 1526
(D. Mass. 1985) (applying the Martin-modified Sindell theory of MSL); Brown v.
Super. Ct., 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988) (resolving ambiguity in Sindell and holding
that manufacturer liability is several only); In re DES Litigation, No. 830-109 (Cal.
Super. Ct., S.F., Aug. 16, 1985) (General Order No. 11) (holding a national market
as the most effective and fair market in DES cases and compiling this national
market information); Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So.2d 275, 286 (Fla. 1991)
(same but requiring that plaintiffs prove that they have "made a genuine attempt to
locate" the responsible manufacturer before using national market information).
178. Martin, 689 P.2d at 383; see also McCormack, 617 F. Supp. at 1526
(applying the Martin-modified Sindell theory of MSL); Conley, 570 So.2d at 286
(extending Martin to require that plaintiffs prove that they have "made a genuine
attempt to locate" the responsible manufacturer).
179. Martin, 689 P.2d at 382.
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Some courts found the application of joint and several liability
In Brown v. Superior Court, the court held that
inappropriate.
manufacturers are only severally liable.1 82 Thus, in cases where not
all manufacturers are joined, liability is still based on actual market
share, potentially resulting in less than a full recovery for plaintiffs.1 83
In Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.1 84 the court adopted a more radical
modification of Sindell's MSL. As in Martin, the New York Court of
Appeals relied on the idea of the "over-all culpability" of all the
manufacturers, which is measured by the "amount of risk of injury
each defendant created to the public-at-large."' 8 5 Because the court
relied on an overall risk produced theory in assigning liability, all
defendant members of the market that manufactured DES for
pregnancy were liable.' 8 6 Additionally, the court held, as in Brown,
that DES manufacturer liability is several.' 8 7
2. National v. Local Market
Another ambiguity in the Sindell holding is what constitutes the
market for purposes of determining defendants' market shares. The
Martin court held that the relevant market should be narrowly defined
and tied to evidence of the geographic market, characteristics of the
DES ingested, and the time period. In contrast, the Hymowitz court
found a national market to be the most fair and appropriate way to

180. See Brown, 751 P.2d at 485 (Cal. 1988) (holding defendants severally
liable); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co. 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989) (same).
181. 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989).
185. Id. at 1078 (noting that a national market is fair because it assesses liability
based on the total culpability of defendants).
186. Id. (noting "[I]t is merely a windfall for a producer to escape liability solely
because it manufactured a more identifiable pill, or sold only to certain drugstores.
These fortuities in no way diminish the culpability of defendant for marketing the
product, which is the basis for liability here").
187. Id. (noting that exculpation would provide a windfall where liability is
based on marketing a product and declining "to increase a defendant's liability
beyond its fair share of responsibility").
188. Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 382-83 (Wash. 1984).
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assess causation because it assigns liability based on the total
culpability of defendants.' 89
3. Application to Other Products
In Sindell, the court dealt exclusively with market share liability as
applied to DES cases. 190 In the absence of a strict prohibition against
applying MSL to other contexts, commentators have argued that
MSL is appropriate for application in other contexts,1 9 1 arguably in
climate change litigation. Plaintiffs nationwide have attempted to
apply MSL (or modified MSL) to other products liability cases.192
E. Commentary on and CritiquesofMarket Share Liability in the
DES Context

Some courts rejected MSL as a novel theory, and commentators
both praised and criticized the theory.1 93 Judicial opinions and articles
supporting or critiquing MSL's applicability have focused on
arguments based in policy and practicality. 194
1. Courts Rejecting Market Share Liability in DES Cases
Despite the acceptance of MSL and its variations, some courts have
declined to adopt the theory as a substitute for causation in the

189. Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1076, 1078; see also In re DES Litigation, No.
830-109 (Cal. Super. Ct., S.F., Aug. 16, 1985) (holding a national market as the
most effective and fair market in DES cases and compiling this national market
information).
190. See supra Part II.C.
191. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-In-Fact
Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 881, 883 (1982) (arguing for
an extension of MSL to indeterminate plaintiffs); Grimm, supra note 138, at 211
(discussing the possibility of an extension of MSL); Glen 0. Robinson, Multiple
Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REv. 713, 749-67
(1982) (same).
192. E.g., Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)
(considering MSL when applied to guns); Sheffield v. Eli Lilly & Co., 144 Cal.
App. 3d 583 (Cal. 1983) (vaccines); Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717
(Haw. 1991) (blood products); Shackil v. Lederle Labs., 561 A.2d 511 (N.J. 1989)
(vaccines); Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So.2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1985) (asbestos).
193. See infra Part II.E.
194. See id.
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context of DES cases.' 95 The Iowa Supreme Court relied on a policy
justification for rejecting MSL.196 The court reasoned that MSL
constituted an insurance plan whereby producers would become
insurers for injuries they did not directly cause. 197 The court also
noted that the doctrine was a drastic departure from long-standing tort
principles, and "involve[d] social engineering more appropriately
within the legislative domain."' 9 8
Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court held that MSL was unfair,
impracticable, and contradictory to the state's public policy.199 The
court did not find the policy justifications of Sindell persuasive.20 0
The court also expressed concern that liability of this magnitude
would discourage pharmaceutical research and development of safe
products because manufacturers would be subject to liability despite
their safety efforts. 2 0 1
2. Scholarship Favoring Market Share Liability in the DES Context
A significant breadth of legal scholarship has been written
supporting the court's adoption of MSL in the DES context. 202 The
195. See infra note 196.
196. Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67, 75 (Iowa 1986).
197. Id. at 76.
198. Id.
199. Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 246 (Mo. 1984).
200. See supra note 167; Zafft, 676 S.W.2d at 247.
201. Zafft, 676 S.W.2d at 247; see also Gorman v. Abbott Labs., 599 A.2d 1364
(R.I. 1991) (requiring identification of particular manufacturer for recovery); Smith
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 337 (Ill. 1990) ("[MSL] is not a sound theory,
is too great a deviation from our existing tort principles and should not be applied
[in DES cases]."). The dissent in Smith offered a comprehensive analysis as to why
the modified MSL theory in Hymowitz should be adopted. Smith, 560 N.E.2d at
345-52 (Clark, J. dissenting).
202. See generally Delgado, supra note 191; John H. Grundhauser, Case Note,
The DES ManufacturerIdentifcation Problem: A FloridaPublic Policy Approach,
40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 857 (1986); Glenn 0. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort
Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713 (1982); Allen Rostron,
Beyond Market Share Liability: A Theory of ProportionalShare Liabilityfor NonFungibleProducts, 52 UCLA L. REv. 151 (2004); Note, Market Share Liability: An
Answer to the DES CausationProblem, 94 HARV. L. REv. 668 (1981) [hereinafter
Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem]; Patricia
A. Meagher, Note, Market Share Liability: A New Method of Recovery for DES
Litigants, 30 CATH. U.L. REv. 551 (1981); David J. Murray, Note, The DES
Causation Conundrum: A FunctionalAnalysis, 32 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 939 (1987);
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scholarship focused on policy reasons for allowing recovery based on
MSL, such as: victim compensation as a goal of tort law, fairness to
those that have been harmed, and deterrence.20 3 Another favorable
aspect of MSL has been found in the rule's narrow scope, which
stems from the practical reality that MSL can only be applied to cases
that meet specific strict requirements.
First, as discussed previously, one of the central goals of tort law is
the compensation of victims.2 04 Because of the factual circumstances
surrounding the DES crisis, plaintiffs who could not prove, through
no fault of their own, that a particular defendant manufactured the
DES they ingested were left without remedy under the traditional tort
rules.205 Commentators suggested that this alternative is unacceptable
and used compensation of innocent victims as a policy justification
for the use of MSL.2 06
Second, commentators have found that overall fairness justifies the
application of MSL. Fairness mandates that wrongdoers be held
liable for the consequences of their harm.2 07 MSL provides a
Richard M. Russell, Note, The Causation Requirement: Guardian of Fairness or
Obstacle to Justice?-Making Sense of a Decade of DES Litigation, 25 SUFFOLK
U.L. REv. 1071 (1991).
203. See, e.g., Grundhauser, supra note 202, at 862 (addressing victim
compensation); Russell, supra note 202, at 1102 (addressing fairness); Russell,
supra note 202, at 1089-90, 1105 (addressing deterrence).
204. See supra note 131 and accompanying text; see also, Grundhauser, supra
note 202, at 862 (recognizing that courts look "to compensate an injured plaintiff
for wrongs others commit").
205. See supra note 145 and accompanying text; see also, Market Share
Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, supra note 202, at 679
(recognizing that because of the facts of the DES cases, many plaintiffs would go
without compensation if not for MSL); Russell, supra note 202, at 1081 (noting the
practical problems with proving the identification requirement).
206. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 202, at 892 (recognizing compensation as a
legitimate purpose to justify the application and possible extension of MSL);
Russell, supra note 202, at 1081 (providing a plaintiff a remedy as the appropriate
policy in the DES context); Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES
Causation Problem, supra note 202, at 680 (noting that compensation of victims is
a reason why MSL is a positive development); Grundhauser, supra note 202, at 877
(indicating that where "the court's focus is on providing compensation to an injured
plaintiff.. . . then relaxation of the identification requirement is appropriate"). But
see, Meagher, supra note 202, at 581 (noting that injury is not a sufficient basis for
recovery without proof that each defendant marketed a defective product).
207. See Robinson, supra note 202, at 743 (recognizing that the policy of holding
a tortfeasor accountable for his fair share of the costs of the harm is fulfilled in
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mechanism through which tortious manufacturers are held liable
where they would escape liability under traditional causation
requirements. 208 Richard Delgado notes that fairness is well served in
MSL because it "allocat[es] loss according to the risk created by each
tortfeasor," 209 however no tortfeasor is held liable for more than their
contribution to the risk to the public (i.e. their market share).2 10
Finally, MSL establishes confidence in the drug industry, by ensuring
that the industry will be held accountable and unable to escape
liability merely because it followed industry practices.211
A second fairness consideration highlighted by scholars
contemplates who should bear the risk of an accident, such as DES
and who is better able to bear that risk.2 12 DES plaintiffs had no way
of ascertaining the negligent defendant who harmed them. 2 13
Therefore, the negligent defendant should bear the risk of his
negligence.2 1 4
A third policy justification is the goal of defendants' deterrence of
defendants from acting negligently and manufacturing defective
products. Scholars argue that holding negligent producers liable, even
though the entire market was equally negligent, "will deter
manufacturers from negligently following others' designs and tests in
the belief that there is safety in the anonymity of numbers." 215 This is
an important policy goal, made more significant because the
manufacturers are the only actors able to guard against defective
216
products in these circumstances.
Deterrence and accident
apportionment of damages); Russell, supra note 202, at 1102 (noting that "[f]rom a
policy standpoint, charging the negligent defendant with its fair share of liability" is
a sound choice).
208. Delgado, supra note 202, at 895.
209. Robinson, supra note 202, at 749.
210. See supra notes 177, 180-183, 187 and accompanying text.
211. See Russell, supra note 202, at 1108.
212. See Meagher, supra note 202, at 580 (discussing the logical application of
the concept promulgated in Summers that "as between an innocent plaintiff and
negligent defendants, the latter should bear the loss").
213. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
214. Russell, supra note 202, at 1089-90, 1105 (noting that all defendants
produced the drug causing plaintiff's harm, therefore they should be liable for their
negligence).
215. Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, supra
note 202, at 677.
216. Grundhauser, supra note 202, at 881-82 (noting that victims of DES would
not be able to take precautions against defective medication).
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avoidance are principles of tort law, which are arguably achieved
through the application of MSL to cases involving DES.2 17
Practically, commentators argue that MSL is appropriate in the
DES context because the unique set of facts limits the scope of the
218
rule.
In order to use MSL, scholars argue, plaintiffs must have
suffered some harm where the passage of time, or other factors,
makes discovery of the individual defendant impossible.2 19
Additionally, the requirement of a fungible product limits the types of
cases in which MSL could be applied.220 Finally, the defendants'
market share must be ascertainable, which will preclude a wide array
of defendants. 22 1 While many scholars and courts argue that the
222
requirement of a "substantial share" of the market is unnecessary,
the type of cases to which MSL is applicable remains narrow.
3. Scholarship Disfavoring Market Share Liability in the DES
Context
While significant legal scholarship has praised the development of
223
MSL, some commentators have harshly critiqued the theory and its
application to the DES cases.224

217. Robinson, supra note 202, at 740 (cautioning that "insist[ing] that a
particular injury be linked to a particular manufacturer's product is to invite
underdeterrence of the risk in every case where there is no proof of [the
identification requirement]").
218. Id. at 749; see also Meagher, supra note 202, at 580-81.
219. Meagher, supra note 202, at 580-8 1.
220. Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, supra
note 202, at 677. But see Robinson, supra note 202, at 750 (arguing there is no
need for the fungibility requirement to be so stringent); Rostron, supra note 202, at
154 (advocating an elimination of the fungibility requirement).
221. See Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem,
supra note 202, at 678-79 (arguing MSL is appropriate only in contexts where the
market is a "reasonably good estimate of the harm done.").
222. See, e.g., Russell, supra note 202, at 1105 (arguing for the elimination of the
"substantial share" requirement).
223. See supra Part II.D.2.
224. See generally Newcomb, supra note 136; Schultz, supra note 129; Lewis
W. Bell, Recent Decisions, Torts-Products Liability-Where a Plaintiff Cannot
Identify Which Drug Company Manufactured the DES Ingested, a Cause of Action
Exists Under the Market Share Alternate Theory of Liability, 55 Miss. L.J. 195
(1985); Cynthia L. Chase, Note, Market Share Liability: A Plea for Legislative
Alternatives, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 1003 (1982).
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The first policy argument against the application of MSL to DES
cases is that MSL strays too far from existing tort principles. 225
Well-accepted exceptions to the identification requirement such as
alternative liability and concert of action 226 ensure that "the burden of
proof would be placed on blameworthy defendants and that liability
would fall, in some measure, on the actual wrongdoer." 227 MSL,
critics argue, deviates from this expansion of tort doctrine, assigning
liability to blameless defendants. This result pushes the boundaries
of tort law too far and cannot be justified by the policy of sensitivity
to plaintiff recovery. 229 Additionally, critics argue that, in accordance
with tort law, drug manufacturers should not be forced into the role
of insurers of their industry, a likely result of the application of
MSL. 230
The second criticism of MSL responds to the justification that
defendants in the pharmaceutical industry are better able to absorb
the costs of liability through insurance and their ability to pass costs
on to consumers.231 Critics of MSL argue that liability will prevent
companies from obtaining insurance, resulting in a decrease in
development of much needed pharmaceuticals. 232 The heightened
exposure to liability coupled with the increase in insurance costs for
drug companies will force the companies to cut back on scientific
research for new drugs and raise the prices of existing drugs,
unrelated to the unsafe drug, to potentially preclusive levels. 2 33
Finally, critics argue that these increased costs will lead to a

225. See Schultz, supra note 129, at 806.
226. See supra Part II.B.
227. Newcomb, supra note 136, at 313.
228. Id.

229. Id.; see also Schultz, supranote 129, at 806.
230. See Schultz, supra note 129, at 813.
231. See supra notes 212-214 and accompanying text.
232. See Bell, supra note 224, at 211; see also Newcomb, supra note 136, at 322
(noting that the policy argument that companies can insure for their losses "ignores
the realities of the modem insurance system"); Schultz, supra note 129, at 809-10
(emphasizing that drug companies are not all in "solid financial condition" and
showing examples of "safe and useful" drugs, Oculinum and Benedectin, that were
forced off the market because of "increased product costs related to potential
liability").
233. See Bell, supra note 224, at 211; Newcomb, supra note 136, at 322.
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narrowing of the market decreasing the availability and variety of
pharmaceutical drugs available to the consumer.234
A final policy argument for rejecting the application of MSL in
DES cases is that the legislature is the more appropriate forum to
provide compensation in DES cases.235 Critics of MSL recognize the
need to compensate the victims of the DES crisis. 236 They argue,
however, that compensation through judicial application of MSL is
legislating from the bench, as it involves a public policy
determination more appropriate for the legislature. 237 Critics argue
that, "Congress can best formulate an equitable yet functional
alternative to the market share theory by analyzing both operative and
pending pieces of legislation which assess a fee or tax on producers
of a particular substance or product." 238 Such a recovery fund would
eliminate costs of litigation and keep traditional tort principles intact,
while allowing the legislature to perform its proper function.239
Critics of MSL in the DES context have practical concerns as
well. 240 Generally, critics find difficulties in applying the theory
based on the "substantial share" requirement, 24 1 defining the relevant
242
market, and determining the market shares of defendants.

234. Schultz, supra note 129, at 810.
235. See Schultz, supra note 129, at 814; see also Chase, supra note 224, at
1042.
236. Schultz, supra note 129, at 814.
237. Id.
238. Chase, supra note 224, at 1042 (noting that, in the past, legislation has
created a trust for victims of emergency that require compensation in the analogous
contexts of oil spills, black lung enactments and the superfund, and that this method
of compensation is the appropriate one).
239. See Schultz, supra note 129, at 814.
240. Id. at 797-805; see also Chase, supra note 224, at 1007-18.
241. Schultz, supra note 129, at 798. Critics argue that Sindell's failure to define
what constitutes a "substantial share" of the DES market, has lead to confusion
about the requirements and a "realistic potential of creating liability
disproportionate to the amount of damage a manufacturer caused" from the
requirement itself. Id. at 798. Because courts have held that the "substantial share"
requirement is unnecessary, and commentators have agreed, further analysis
regarding critiques of the "substantial share" requirement is unnecessary. See
Russell, supra note 202, at 1105 (arguing for the elimination of the "substantial
share" requirement).
242. Schultz, supra note 129, at 797-805; see also Chase, supra note 224, at
1007-18.
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First, critics argue that defining the relevant market will be
prohibitively difficult and potentially arbitrary and unfair. 243 Because
DES was a product sold for a variety of uses "the quantity of DES
manufactured solely for use in problem pregnancies is impossible to
calculate." 244 Additionally determining the geographic market is
significant because a defendant's liability will vary considerably
depending on whether a local or national market is used. 245 This
could lead to an arbitrary determination of the market and unfair
apportionment of liability. 246 Finally, determining the time frame of
the market poses problems in situations "where the exposure takes
place over an extended length of time." 24 7 Second, critics argue that
determining individual market shares in DES cases is almost
impossible because of the "unavailability or inadequacy of the
relevant economic data." 248
F. Limitations on the Application of Market Share Liability PostSindell

This section examines the limitations of applying MSL to other
contexts, which is relevant in determining if MSL is appropriate in
climate change cases. Commentators have argued that MSL is
appropriate for application in other contexts. 24 9 Similarly, various
plaintiffs nationwide have attempted to extend MSL (or modified
MSL) theory to other products liability cases involving traditional
tort rules. 250 This section looks at limitations on expanding MSL into
other contexts through judicial and scholarly discussions.
243. Chase, supra note 224, at 1007-09.
244. Id. at 1007.
245. Schultz, supra note 129, at 799.
246. See Chase, supra note 224, at 1008.
247. See id. at 1009 (noting that time frame is not a significant issue in DES
cases but would be for cases like asbestos if the "market share percentages are fluid
and constantly in flux").
248. Id. at 1010; see also Schultz, supra note 129, at 801 (noting that the
inadequacy of the records is no fault of either party, but insufficient records
stemming from poor record keeping practices and the fact that many manufacturers
are not in business anymore will prove to be a problem at the trial stage).
249. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 202, at 883 (arguing for an extension of MSL
to indeterminate plaintiffs); Robinson, supra note 202, at 749-67 (discussing the
possibility of an extension of MSL); Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to

the DES CausationProblem,supra note 202, at 678-79.
250. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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1. Fungibility
The process of designating a product as fungible is delicate and
nuanced for courts; while some deem items such as blood products,
vaccines, and asbestos-lined-break pads fungible, others find
fungibility missing in similar circumstances based on minor factual
differences. 251 First, courts have considered whether the plaintiff is
alleging a design defect, 252 or alternatively, a manufacturing defect 25 3
in its determination of whether the product is fungible. 25 4 The Morris
court explained that because a design defect means the entire class of
vaccines was defective, it is more fungible than a manufacturing
defect where one vaccine deviated from the class.2 55 Similarly, the
Sheffield court noted injuries resulting from a manufacturing defect
were the result "not of a unit of total generic pharmaceutical product
[as was the case in Sindell] but a deviant defective vaccine." 256 The
court explained that it would be unfair for innocent manufacturers to
be held responsible for the injury caused by one manufacturer who
produced a defective vaccine.2 57
Secondly, courts consider the product's composition in
determining if the product meets the fungibility requirement.258 DES
was a product made from an identical formula, making the
determination of fungibility quite straightforward.2 5 9 While some
251. See infra notes 254-60 and accompanying text.
252. A design defect is an "injury producing agent ... common to all products of
a certain line, and the defect lies in the original design or model." Morris v. Parket,
Davis & Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332, 1335 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
253. A manufacturing defect is a deviation from "the manufacturer's intended
result or from other ostensibly identical units of the same product line." See id.
254. See id at 1348 (holding that a vaccine was fungible where it had a design
defect). But see, Sheffield v. Eli Lilly & Co., 144 Cal. App. 3d 583, 594, 599 (C.D.
Cal. 1983) (holding a vaccine was not fungible where it had a manufacturing rather
than a design defect).
255. Morris, 667 F. Supp. at 1341.
256. Sheffield, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 599.
257. See id.
258. See Shackil v. Lederle Labs., 561 A.2d 511, 522 (N.J. 1989) (holding a
vaccine may be fungible even if made from a biological, as opposed to chemical,
formula, but ultimately reinstating the judgment for defendant manufacturers on
public policy grounds).
259. See supra note 148 and accompanying text; see also Smith v. Cutter
Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717, 724 (Haw. 1991) (noting that Factor VIII, a blood
product used to treat hemophilia did not have the "constant quality" of DES).
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courts have held strictly that variance in chemical or biological
formula destroys fungibility,260 other courts and commentators have
argued for a looser standard of fungibility.261 For example, in
declining to apply MSL to the defectively manufactured vaccine in
Shackil, the court noted that it was not persuaded that all biological
formulas are inappropriate for MSL as some courts argued.2 62 The
court relied on interchangeability of use as an indication that the
product is fungible. 26 3
In a more dramatic move away from the strict fungibility
requirement, the Eastern District of New York engaged in a debate
regarding the fungibility of handguns. 264 There, the courts fashioned
another factor to rely on in determining fungibility: the uniformity of
risk posed by the product. 265 The district court found handguns to be
266
The court highlighted the
fungible for the purposes of MSL.
both users and victims. 26 7
of
the
view
from
handguns
of
fungibility
Criminal defendants using the guns have indicated there is no

260. See Shackil, 561 A.2d at 521-22 (holding that variances in the method of
manufacturing destroyed fungibility). See also City of Phila. v. Lead Indus. Assn.,
994 F.2d 112, 123-24 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that lead paint was not fungible for
purposes of MSL because of differing formulas used by manufacturers); Brenner v.
Am. Cyanamid Co., 263 A.D. 2d 165, 172 (N.Y. 1999) (same); see also Marshall v.
Celotex Corp., 651 F. Supp. 389, 393 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (recognizing the
differences between DES, an identical physical composition, and asbestos products
containing varying ranges of toxicity and thus not fungible); Goldman v. JohnsManville Sales Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691, 700-01 (Ohio 1987) (noting that asbestos is
not fungible as was DES because it is a name for a "family of minerals" and that
there is a "significant difference in the percentage of asbestos used" in the products
causing the harm); Rostron, supra note 202, at 183-84 (noting that MSL was a bad
rule of law to apply to asbestos cases because of its fungibility requirement and
favoring a recovery based on proportional share liability); Jane Stapleton, The Two
Explosive Proof-of-CausationDoctrines Central to Asbestos Claims, 74 BROOK. L.
REv. 1011, 1020 (2009) (noting that the absence of fungibility precluded recovery
under MSL in asbestos cases).
261. See Shackil, 561 A.2d at 522, 529.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); rev'd
sub nom Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1067 (N.Y. 2001).
265. Hamilton, 750 N.E.2d at 1067.
266. Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 844.
267. Id.
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difference in the type of handgun they use, despite the guns having
different manufacturers or designs.2 68
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's
holding on the basis that guns were not fungible in that they did not
pose a uniform risk.269 Because gun manufacturers participated in
"different marketing activities that allegedly contributed to the illegal
handgun market in different ways and to different extents," the
application of MSL would not result in an allocation that reflected
contribution of risk.270 Despite this reversal, the debate is significant
in fashioning what it means to be a fungible product.
Courts have shifted the focus of the fungibility determination to the
interchangeability of products. 271 In Thomas ex rel. Gramling v.
Mallet,272 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a variation of MSL,
273
was applicable in a lead paint poisoning case. In Thomas, the court
held that the white lead carbonate used by defendant pigment
manufacturers was fungible even though it could have been made
from one of three moderately distinct chemical formulas.274
Fungibility depended on the interchangeability of the product, the
inability to distinguish the product physically, and the presence of a
uniform degree of risk.27 5 Based on those factors, the court found that
276
the lead pigment was fungible.
Finally, in Wheeler v. Raybestos-Manhattan,277 five plaintiffs

sought compensation for injuries resulting from exposure to asbestos
lined brake pads. Regarding fungibility, the court held that the break
pads were fungible based on use and interchangeability of the
product, despite the absence of one chemical formula for break

268. Id. (highlighting that the fungibility of handguns is even clearer from the
vantage point of the victims).
269. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1067 (N.Y. 2001).
270. Id.
271. See Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717, 724 (Haw. 1991)
(recognizing that "the [HIV infected blood] product is fungible insofar as it can be
used interchangeably"). See also Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallet, 701 N.W.2d
523, 559 (Wis. 2005) (holding the same in the lead paint context).
272. 701 N.W.2d 523 (Wis. 2005).
273. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 557-58.
274. Id. at 559-62.
275. Id. at 560-62.
276. See id. at 562.
277. 8 Cal. App. 4th 1152 (1st Dist. 1992).
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pads.2 78 Additionally, the court noted that the pads were all composed
solely of the same kind of asbestos and that the amount of asbestos in
each pad varied within a limited range (between forty and sixty
percent asbestos by weight). 279
2. Determining a Market
Sindell and subsequent DES cases recognize that it is necessary to
find the relevant market from which to ascertain defendants' market
share in order to apply MSL. 280 The debate is generally whether to
use a local or national market. 281 The determination of what market to
use limits the scope of plaintiffs that can use MSL, so only in cases
where a market can be ascertained will MSL be applied.2 82
In extending the use of MSL to contexts other than DES, courts
and critics have noted the difficulty of determining a market for
283
certain products.
Where courts have done so and used MSL, they
have used national markets for DES and other products alike. 284
Commentators argue that the difficulty of obtaining a suitable market

278. Id. at 1156.
279. Id at 1156 (noting that even though the brake pads are not "absolutely
interchangeable" for each other and therefore are "not fungible from the standpoint
of an auto mechanic, they are fungible for the purposes of Sindell by virtue of
containing roughly comparable quantities of the single asbestos fiber, chrysotile").
Cf Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. 514 N.E.2d 691, 697, 701 (Ohio 1987)
(holding that the variance of asbestos content by weight in duct tape from 15 to 100
percent was too significant for fungibility and also affected the risk of harm each
manufacturer undertook).
280. See supra notes 169, 188-189.
281. See supra notes 188-189. This debate is mirrored in the climate change
context but between the use of a national or international market. See supra Part
II.D.2.
282. See supra notes 221 and accompanying text.
283. Brenner v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 263 A.D.2d 165, 171 (N.Y. 1999)
(recognizing that one type of lead would only account for about eighty percent of
the lead in all lead paint, and the remainder may be manufactured by unnamed
defendants, as well as the fact that the market was not limited to products for
interior use).
284. Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717, 728 (Haw. 1991) (noting, in
the context of blood products, overall culpability for marketing the product was
appropriate due to the minimal number of manufacturers and thus a "national
market is the more equitable consideration"); see also supra note 189.
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appropriately limits the use of MSL to a unique set of facts, quelling
the policy concern of overwhelming liability for manufacturers. 2 85
3. Policy Considerations
Policy considerations also cabin the extension of MSL to other
products.
a. StuntingDevelopment

In rejecting the application of MSL particularly in the vaccine
context, the California Court of Appeals for the First District and the
Supreme Court of New Jersey emphasized concern that imposing
liability on vaccine manufacturers would deter development of safe
and necessary drugs.286 In Sheffield and subsequent cases, the crucial
public policy concern was to encourage the production of new and
potentially life-saving drug products. 287 The court reasoned that
manufacturers would be reluctant to produce these products, such as
the polio vaccine, if MSL applied to them. 288 Accordingly, thousands
of people suffering from polio would not have had the benefit of
Salk's polio vaccine. 2 89
Though Sheffield seems to drastically limit the applicability of
MSL, other courts have gone out of their way to note that the theory
should be used in some circumstances. For example, the majority in
Shackil noted that its opinion "should not be read as forecasting an
inhospitable response to the theory of market[]share liability in an
appropriate context, perhaps one in which its application would be
consistent with public policy and where no other remedy would be
available." 290

285. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
286. See Sheffield v. Eli Lilly & Co., 144 Cal. App. 3d 583. 597-98 (Cal. 1983);
Shackil v. Lederle Labs., 561 A.2d 511, 522 (N.J. 1989).
287. See Sheffield, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 597-98.
288. Id. at 599.
289. Id.
290. See Shackil, 561 A.2d at 529. See also id. at 535 (O'Hern J. dissenting)
(recognizing the majority opinion as having "no objection to the market[]share
concept of causation, but is solely, and perhaps justifiably concerned that the
imposition of any liability on this clearly beneficial vaccine will be detrimental to
society's interest . . . .").
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Commentators have recognized that the prominent reason that
courts have rejected the application of MSL in the vaccines context is
the negative impact liability would have on the development of safer
vaccines and on the general availability of drugs that have a high

social utility. 29 1
b. Preemption of Claims by FederalLegislation

Another limit on the ability of courts to extend MSL to cases
outside the DES context is potentially preemptive legislative
compensation schemes. Where Congress has spoken and awarded a
comprehensive recovery system for victims of a toxic tort or product
defect, courts and commentators will not allow the extension of MSL
to those claims, such as in the context of vaccines292 and blood
products. 293 However, the courts saw the lack of a congressional
compensation act in the lead paint context as indicative of the
legislature's intent not to compensate victims of lead paint poisoning
294
and subsequently barred victim recovery through MSL.
4. Justification for Limiting the Extension of Market Share Liability
to Particularized Facts
The attempted extension of MSL to contexts other than DES shows
the limits on the applicability of the doctrine. An Oklahoma court
denying the appropriateness of MSL in the asbestos context
highlighted the importance of the right set of facts in the possibility
of its application.295 It stated: "Because [MSL] . . . eliminates proof

of causation of injury for public policy reasons, it must also be
291. See Schultz, supra note 129, at 793-94.
292. See Shackil, 561 A.2d at 524, 527 (noting that the expansion of tort concepts
in MSL would conflict with the goals of recent efforts of Congress through the
comprehensive National Childhood Vaccine Act of 1986 and thus MSL should not
apply); see also Andrew R. Klein, Causation and Uncertainty: Making
Connections in a Time of Change, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 5, 41-42 (2008) (recognizing
that the legislation asks litigants to waive any claims against manufacturers). But
see, Rosenberg, supra note 124, at 866 (arguing that the court in Sheffield should
impose a form of MSL called proportional liability).
293. See Klein, supranote 292, at 38-39 (noting that the Rickey Ray Hemophilia
Relief Act of 1998, which allocated compensation to victims who had contracted
HIV from contaminated blood products provided a "limited-scope" relief system).
294. Brenner v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 263 A.D.2d 165, 169, 173-74, (N.Y. 1999).
295. See generally Case v. Fibreboard Corp., 743 P.2d 1062 (Okla. 1987).

2011]

CLIMATE CHANGE AND MARKET SHARE LIABILITY

473

clearly founded in facts which support the link between the injury
suffered and the risk to which the plaintiff was exposed." 2 96 It is
precisely these limits that help quell critics' fears of excessive
liability on manufacturers in contexts outside DES such as climate
change.
Next, this Note will briefly look at the limited legal commentary
regarding the application of MSL to climate change litigation to help
determine the appropriateness of such an application.
G. ScholarshipAddressing Market Share Liability in Climate Change
Nuisance Claims
There is limited scholarship undertaking an analysis of the
application of MSL to climate change litigation. Mostly, this limited
pool has rejected MSL based on courts' reluctance to expand the
application to other areas and the complicated factual issues
involved.29 7 Douglas Kysar suggests that climate change plaintiffs do
not need MSL. 298 Kysar acknowledges that greenhouse gas emissions
"do seem to have that elusive quality of fungibility." 299 Nevertheless,
he notes that because all the defendants' emissions contribute to a
"single global process that causes all harms[,]" only several liability

296. Id. at 1066.
297. See A.B.A., supra note 7, at 4-5; Kysar, supra note 101, at 56; Reeves,
supra note 119, at 522.
298. Kysar, supra note 101, at 33.
299. Id.; see also Jonathan Zasloff, Symposium, The Judicial Carbon Tax:
Reconstructing Public Nuisance and Climate Change, 55 UCLA L. REv. 1827,
1868 (2008) (noting that CO 2 is fungible for purposes of MSL because "a carbon is
a carbon is a carbon. It makes no difference in terms of its impact" where it comes
from). But see Grimm, supra note 138, at 219 (2007) (noting that a fungible
product is lacking in greenhouse gas emissions but that they are fungible "in that
they are indivisible once released into the atmosphere").
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is appropriate.300 Kysar provides no explanation as to why this is the
answer or how this would be workable in practice. 30 1
One student Note created a proposed model for using MSL to
allocate damages among CO 2 producers. 302 The Note focuses on a
practical scientific model for using MSL in this context. 30 3 it
proposes that defendants should be allowed a reasonable level of
emissions (to be determined by a micro-balancing theory) and will be
held liable based on MSL if they exceed that level.3 04
While the model itself is similar to the emissions regulation
plaintiffs seek in AEP, and thus could be similarly fraught with
political question problems, 30 5 the Note provides a useful answer to
the problem of absent causes in climate change litigation.30 The Note
recognizes that a problem with climate change litigation is that no
market of greenhouse gas emitters will be complete.3 07 But because
the liability is based on the harmful effects of greenhouse gas
emissions and not negligent manufacturing, there is more of a
connection between volume of emissions and actual harm. 30 8
Therefore, there is less of a risk of in-market free riding (where
300. Kysar, supra note 101, at 37. But see Lauren Case, Comment, Climate
Change:A New Realm of Tort Litigation, and How to Recover When the Litigation
Heats Up, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 265, 287-88, 296-97 (2011) (arguing for the
application of the "commingled product" theory of market share liability advanced
in Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether products liability litigation promulgated in 2005 and
highlighting policy goals of deterrence and practical requirements of comingling
into a "single batch," as in the petroleum product litigation).
301. Kysar, supra note 101, at 37. But see Grimm, supra note 138, at 226-27
(noting that a "more refined approach" to liability in the climate change context is
MSL rather than traditional tort principles because of the requirement of proximate
cause).
302. See Grimm, supra note 138, at 209.
303. Id. at 211.
304. See id. at 232-39.
305. See supra notes 83, 86, 88, 90.
306. Grimm, supra note 138, at 224-32 (noting that it may be reasonable to
apply market share liability principles, hold CO 2 emitters culpable in proportion to
their emissions provided that they emit a substantial amount of the CO 2 released by
humans, but also noting that a joint and several liability scheme may be fair
because every CO 2 emitter is culpable).
307. See id at 224-25 (noting that greenhouse gas emissions come from natural
causes that also contribute to global warming and not all emitters can be practically
joined in a lawsuit).
308. Id. at 229.
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smaller firms are able to escape substantial liability by hiding behind
larger firms).30 9 In climate change litigation, harm is based on the
volume of greenhouse gas emitted, not manufacturers' negligence in
producing a product. 310 Using a MSL theory, defendants can join
unnatural absent causal factors not joined by plaintiffs.3 1 1
Having addressed the scholarship on the application of MSL to
climate change cases, this Note now explains why MSL is a viable
option for some climate change plaintiffs.
III. USING MARKET SHARE LIABILITY TO SATISFY THE
IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENT IN KIVALINA

Part III considers why MSL is an appropriate theory to meet the
third element of causation, the identification requirement, in Kivalina
and cases like it, where plaintiffs have suffered damages that can be
monetized. First, Part III.A explains how the Supreme Court is likely
to rule in AEP and why, because of the factual differences between
AEP and Kivalina, even a broad Supreme Court ruling in AEP will
not preempt suit in Kivalina. Next, Part III.B explains that the policy
justifications used for adopting MSL in the DES and other contexts
apply to the Kivalina plaintiffs. Next, Part III.C outlines how
Kivalina meets the practical requirements of Sindell. Next, Part III.D
explains why the market share model used in Hymowitz is the most
appropriate. Finally, Part III.E addresses the policy critiques of MSL
cases, and shows they are not dispositive here, because defendants'
several liability, the remedy sought, and the special standing of
plaintiffs seeking damages in a nuisance suit will help shield
defendants from excessive liability and prevent harm to their social
utility.

309. See id. at 228-29 (noting that "in [torts resulting from negligence] . .. actual
harm is largely detached from volume, while tort liability and volume are closely
connected").
310. Id. at 229.
311. See id. at 229-30 (noting that joint and several liability, which requires a
substantial factor test in determining who may be joined, is not as appropriate as
MSL in climate change litigation because emitters that do not constitute a
substantial factor are still responsible for causing the harm and should be joined if
desired by the parties).
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A. Implications of a Supreme CourtRuling in AEP on Kivalina
As a preliminary matter this section considers how a ruling in AEP
might affect an opportunity for Kivalina plaintiffs to continue
litigating.
1. Standing
In considering AEP, the Supreme Court must decide if the
plaintiffs-states and private parties-have standing to bring a
federal nuisance claim. 3 12 In order to establish standing plaintiffs
must show an "injury in fact attributable to the defendant and
redressable by relief against that defendant." 313 The Second Circuit
held that the plaintiff need only allege that defendants "contribute[d]"
to global warming to prove traceability. 3 14 Nevertheless, it is possible
the Supreme Court will find the injury alleged would not be
redressable by emissions caps because of third party contribution and
the latent nature of climate change, 315 or that Massachusetts v. EPA
does not apply because AEP is a non-statutory cause of action. 316 On
the other hand, the Court may find that Massachusetts requires a
relaxed standing requirement for states bringing nuisance claims
regarding pollution. 3 17 Even if the Supreme Court does not adopt the
Second Circuit's relaxed standing requirement, it is likely that the
Court would find Kivalina plaintiffs, unlike AEP plaintiffs, have
standing to proceed.
First, defendants concede Kivalina plaintiffs' concrete injury, 318
and the injury in AEP and Kivalina is significantly different. Douglas
312. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 96, at *2.
313. Id. at *13 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
314. Connecticut v. AEP, 583 F.3d 309, 345 (2d Cir. 2009).
315. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 96, at *13-14.
316. Id., at 15-16 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
317. See AEP, 582 F.3d at 337-38 (relying on Supreme Court precedent in
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), where the Court held a lower standing
requirement was appropriate where a state sought the right of judicial review
conferred by the CAA); see also Kysar, supra note 101, at 31 (noting "it is clear
that contribution to a pollution nuisance above a de minimis threshold can give rise
to damages liability or injunctive relief, notwithstanding the presence of numerous
other contributors").
318. See Plaintiffs Corrected Consolidated Opposition to Rule 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) Motions at 97, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Co., 663 F. Supp.
2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 08-01138), 2008 WL 4579993.
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Kysar suggests that the damage to the Kivalina plaintiffs' community
due to increased storm exposure "is more amenable to causal
attribution than many other impacts of climate change."319 In
contrast, plaintiffs in AEP allege a variety of present and future harms
where the connection seems more untenable. 320
Additionally, the AEP plaintiffs include government plaintiffs,
states, and non-government plaintiffs, the land trusts. 32 1 Plaintiffs are
extremely diverse and represent the interests of seventy-seven million
people. 322 It can be presumed that these seventy-seven million people
have had an impact on global warming through their use of fossil
fuels.3 23 On the other hand, the plaintiffs in Kivalina, while still
government plaintiffs, are limited to the interests of the 400 Inupiat
Eskimo residents.3 24 Additionally, they are extremely vulnerable in
their current situation and have contributed negligibly to global
warming. 325
Second, defendants' emissions of global warming have, in part,
caused plaintiffs' injuries through their contribution to the
uncontroversial process of global warming. 326 Finally, unlike the
plaintiffs in AEP, defendants' liability and contribution of damages
would directly redress the harm alleged.3 27
2. Federal Common Law
The Second Circuit held that a nuisance claim brought under
federal common law was appropriate where plaintiffs state a nuisance

319. Kysar, supra note 101, at 28.
320. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
324. See Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 868 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 108-109, 115 and accompanying text.
326. See supra note 126; Brief of Plaintiffs at 98, Native Vill. of Kivalina v.
ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp.2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 08-01138), 2008
WL 4579993.
327. See Brief of Plaintiffs, supra note 318, at 105. Additionally scholars note
that, like the Kivalina plaintiffs, "states suing in their proprietary capacity as
landowners typically are not restricted from pursuing damages." Kysar supra note
101, at 24.
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claim based on interstate pollution that is unregulated by the EPA.328
It is possible that the Supreme Court may find that because, under
Massachusetts, the EPA has authority through the CAA to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions, the CAA constitutes a regulatory scheme
that "speaks directly to the alleged problem identified in the
complaint, rendering resort to federal common law not only
unnecessary but improper." 329
Even if the Supreme Court rules that the EPA's authority under the
CAA displaces federal common law suits, it is likely that the Court
would still find Kivalina viable under federal common law.
Massachusetts bestowed upon the EPA the authority to regulate, or
cap, greenhouse gas emissions. 330 Nevertheless, the EPA has yet to
act on this authority. 33 1 Even if the EPA does regulate emissions,
there is "no federal liability regime under which Kivalina could seek
compensatory damages."332 Defendants in AEP argue, and the Court
may agree, that displacement of federal common law does not come
from "whether or to what extent an agency has" regulated behavior
but "whether Congress has addressed the subject in a legislative
scheme." 333 Regardless of the actions of the EPA, the Court arguably
can find AEP plaintiffs' claims displaced. But because no conception
of proposed emissions regulation covers monetary compensation for
past harms attributed to emissions, Kivalina's claims are not
displaced.
3. Political Question
The Supreme Court may rule that AEP presents political questions
inappropriate for judicial determination. The plaintiffs seek to cap
defendants' CO 2 emissions at a reasonable level in order to reduce

328. See Connecticut v. AEP, 582 F.3d 309, 332 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that the
CAA provides the EPA authority to regulate CO 2 emissions, but that until the EPA
exercises that authority a federal common law claim is not displaced).
329. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 96, at *21 (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
330. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
332. See Brief of Plaintiffs, supra note 317, at 20-21 (noting that "no remedial
scheme for past emissions" would come from the EPA's regulation of greenhouse
gas emissions).
333. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 96, at *21 (emphasis added).
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future harm from the effects of global warming. 334 The United States
has refused to enact legislation regulating emissions or even to join in
the Kyoto Protocol's pledge to reduce emissions.3 35 The executive
and legislature have considered these options 336 and declined to act
on them, indicating that to do so would involve a policy
determination. Because a decision to cap emissions would involve a
policy determination of what the reasonable level of emissions would
be and whether or not emissions can be capped at all, it is possible
the Court will hold AEP involves political questions better suited for
the legislature.
Even if the Court finds a political question in AEP, the facts of
Kivalina are so distinct that such a holding does not present a bar to
Kivalina and similar cases. Most significantly, plaintiffs in AEP seek
injunctive relief, while plaintiffs in Kivalina seek damages only,
limited to the cost of relocation.3 3 7 As discussed above, defendants
must have acted unreasonably in causing the plaintiffs harm when
awarding injunctive relief.338 Additionally, courts are more reluctant
to award injunctive relief when the defendant provides a social
utility. 33 9 Not only are courts more willing to award damages over an
injunction, but an award of damages involves fewer policy

determinations. 34 0
Damages are a long-standing remedy in tort to recover for past
harms. 34 1 Plaintiffs in Kivalina seek to recover damages based on
past harms in a tort suit. 34 2 Unlike the plaintiffs in AEP who seek to
determine an appropriate level to cap defendants' emissions, 343 and
potentially all CO 2 emitters' emissions, Kivalina plaintiffs seek only
334. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 83, 110 and accompanying text.
338. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text; see also Kysar, supra note
101, at 26 (noting that "[judges] are understandably reluctant to shut down
activities of central economic importance" and thus shy away from injunctive relief
in such circumstances).
340. Here the determination is not at what level emissions should be capped and
not even who should bear the cost of liability, but rather tort liability for monetary
harm caused.
341. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
342. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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the traditional tort remedy to recover their relocation costs, making
them whole.34 4
Because AEP and Kivalina are factually distinguishable, a narrow
or broad Supreme Court ruling in AEP will not preclude Kivalina and
similar suits from adjudication on the merits.
B. Do Sindell's Policy JustificationsApply to Kivalina?
This section now turns to whether MSL is appropriate beginning
with the policy justifications of Sindell. The majority of the policy
justifications used by courts and commentators for accepting the
application of MSL in DES and other contexts is applicable to
climate change litigation. As a background matter, the Sindell court
noted that in a complex industrial society, modifications to strict tort
requirements are appropriate where these standards are inadequate to
administer the responsibility of a manufacturer to a consumer.345
1. Creation of Risk to an Innocent Victim
The first policy justification is a creation of risk to an innocent
victim. 346 The defendants in Kivalina are composed of twenty-four
oil, energy, and utility companies.34 7 These companies have
contributed to global warming through emissions of greenhouse
gases, most notably CO 2.348 As noted above, the creation of risk in
climate change litigation is based on volume of emissions, not on
negligence in manufacturing a defective product. 349 The risk to
plaintiffs has been created based on defendants' contributions to
global warming. Global warming has already taken its toll on
Kivalina: the reduction of sea ice due to increased annual
temperatures has decreased the village's protection from winter
storms.350 As a result, the village has become nearly uninhabitable,
and must be relocated to ensure survival.3 5 1

344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 110- 114.
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Commentators might question the innocence of plaintiffs here,
suggesting that individuals also contribute significantly to global
warming.352 However, Kivalina plaintiffs are innocent because their
contribution to global warming is negligible in volume compared to
the twenty-four named defendants, given the size of their group and
their lifestyle. 353 This is further supported by academic commentary
that highlights compensation of victims as a central goal of tort
law. 3 54 As in the context of DES, plaintiffs here would go without a
remedy without a relaxation of the identification requirement because
of the nature of greenhouse gas emissions.3 55 The application of
MSL in the Kivalina case is appropriate to serve the goal of victim
compensation.
2. Defendants Are In a Superior Position to Absorb the Costs of the
Harm
The second policy justification, that defendants are in a superior
position to absorb the costs of the harm, 356 is also met here. The
defendants joined in Kivalina represent some of the most gainful and
lucrative companies in the world.3 5 7 The ACE and the GAO estimate
the cost of Kivalina's relocation to be between ninety-five and 400
million dollars. 358 The 400 Inupiat Eskimos living in Kivalina, who
have been self-sustained there for centuries, cannot absorb this
cost. 359 Clearly, twenty-four lucrative energy and utility companies
can much more reasonably absorb Kivalina's ninety-five to 400
million dollar relocation costs than can 400 self-sustaining Eskimos.
3. Fairness
An additional policy concern is the concept of fairness-holding
people liable for the consequences of their harm.360 Because it is
352. See, e.g., Albert C. Lin, Evangelizing Climate Change, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 1146 (2009) (internal citation omitted).
353. See supra note 115.
354. See Grundhauser,supra note 202, at 862.
355. See articles cited supra note 205 and accompanying text; see also supra
notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
356. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
357. See Kysar, supra note 101, at 28.
358. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 101, 105 and accompanying text.
360. See Robinson, supra note 202, at 743.
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factually impossible for plaintiffs in Kivalina to identify who has
caused their injury, defendants who have significantly contributed to
plaintiffs' harm would not be held liable. MSL is especially fair in
holding defendants liable because it ensures that no one will be
responsible for more than their market share, or their contribution to
the risk of injury.361 In this sense, defendants would not become
insurers of their industry, a major critique by opponents of MSL,3 62
because they are only accountable for their direct contribution to the
injury. 363
Additionally, scholars have argued that MSL applied to greenhouse
gas emissions may be a more accurate substitute for the identification
requirement than when applied to chemically fungible products such
as DES.364 Unlike the DES context, or that of vaccines, handguns,
blood products, lead paint, or asbestos, every producer in the
greenhouse gas market has not merely added to the risk of injury, but
has directly caused plaintiffs harm through some contribution to

global warming.365
The policy justifications given for the creation and application of
MSL are applicable in the Kivalina context and also justify an
application to other similar climate change litigation. 366 Next, this
361. See id at 749.
362. See generally, Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67, 75 (Iowa 1986);
Schultz, supra note 129, at 813.
363. See supra notes 309-310 and accompanying text.
364. See Grimm, supra note 138, at 221.
365. Id.
366. One potential criticism of the assertion that the policy justifications of
Sindell apply in climate change litigation is that MSL is less appropriate because
the defendants did not act negligently in the traditional sense. This concern is
addressed in two ways. First, the critique is addressed by the design v.
manufacturing defect question mentioned in the application of MSL to other
products. See supra notes 252-254 and accompanying text. A design defect claim
in the MSL context is more like strict liability because companies were not acting
negligently but rather there was something inherently wrong with the design that
was not anticipated. A manufacturing defect is a clearer display of negligence and
generally courts did not apply MSL in manufacturing defect cases. See supra notes
252-254 and accompanying text. Defendants are not acting negligently by
emitting greenhouse gasses, at least in a traditional sense, but their non-negligent
behavior has caused plaintiffs harm and thus they should be held accountable. A
second answer is found in the nuisance claim itself. To recover damages the
interference need not be unreasonable it must only be a monetizeable interference.
See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text. Therefore, the special injury
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Note considers whether plaintiffs in Kivalina can satisfy the practical
requirements of Sindell.
C. Do the Kivalina Plaintiffs Meet the PracticalRequirements of

Sindell?
Courts and scholars have unanimously argued that MSL is only
appropriate in very specialized factual circumstances. 367 Courts and
scholars considering the appropriateness of MSL have required that
the product be fungible, 36 8 plaintiff is unable, through no fault of her
own, to identify the defendant responsible for her harm,369 and
defendants market shares are determinable. 370 For Kivalina plaintiffs
to utilize MSL they must prove that (1) greenhouse gases are
fungible, (2) that they cannot identify the defendant responsible for
their harm, and (3) that defendants' market shares of greenhouse gas
emissions are determinable. Because the plaintiffs in Kivalina meet
all of these requirements, MSL is appropriate for use in their case.
1. Fungibility
Strictly speaking, greenhouse gas emissions are not products
placed on the market for consumers made with a common formula.
Therefore, the fungibility standard that the "formula of the [product
be] identical"371 is not easily met. Indeed, a justification by many
courts for refusing to extend MSL to handguns,3 72 lead paint,37 3 and
asbestos 374 was based on the lack of fungibility of the product.
Nevertheless, by focusing on the inherent interchangeability of the
product, courts have found that products that lack identical formulas
are fungible for the purpose of MSL. 375 Additionally, New York's
requirement for damages adds up to a strict liability recovery rather than
negligence.
367. See supra notes 168, 218 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 168, 220 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 168, 219 and accompanying text.
370. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
371. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 269-270 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 264268 and accompanying text.
373. See supra note 260 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 271-276
and accompanying text.
374. See supra note 260 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 277-279.
375. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
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use of a common risk of injury in determining fungibility (or lack
thereof) of handguns is particularly useful here. 376
First, greenhouse gases are inherently interchangeable in that they
combine to produce a common effect, global warming, and they are
indistinguishable from one another once released.3 7 7 Thus, based on
the looser standard of fungibility promulgated by courts,378
greenhouse gases are interchangeable and fungible for MSL
purposes. Second, because global warming is caused by greenhouse
gas emissions (a fact not reputably debated in scientific
communities) 379 the emission of any and every greenhouse gas
creates a common risk of injury, satisfying New York's test for
fungibility. 380 Based on these two tests, interchangeability and
common risk of injury, greenhouse gases qualify as fungible for
market share purposes.
In further support of the fungibility of greenhouse gases, scholars
This
that have addressed the issue have found them to be fungible.
insight should be considered in the Kivalina case.
2. Plaintiffs' Inability to Identify the Defendant Responsible for Their
Harm
The second requirement articulated in Sindell is that a plaintiff,
through no fault of her own, must be unable to identify the
responsible defendant. 382 The plaintiffs in Kivalina are absolutely
unable to identify the particular defendants that caused their harm,
because of the nature of greenhouse gas emissions: they are invisible
and create negative effects over long periods of time, and the harm is
a product of a variety of factors, some man-made and some
natural.383 No amount of due diligence would allow the Kivalina
plaintiffs to discover the particular defendant that caused their harm.
Therefore, MSL is appropriate in this context. Critics might suggest
proving causation is difficult, even impossible, in climate change
cases because of the diffuse nature of greenhouse gases. While proof
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.

See cases cited supra notes 264-279.
See supra notes 8-10, 299 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 274-76 and accompanying text.
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 264-268 and accompanying text.
See supra note 299.
See supra notes 168, 219 and accompanying text.
See generally supra Introduction.
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of causation in these cases is a daunting task, the fact that the
Kivalina defendants produce significant amounts of greenhouse
gases,384 which have been proven to cause global warming,385
demonstrates that defendants as a group are responsible, even if not
solely responsible. As parties responsible for plaintiffs' injuries,
defendants should be held liable under MSL.
3. Determination of Market Share
The final requirement, the ability to determine defendants' market
shares, was not set out in Sindell. Rather, the requirement emerged
through academic critiques of the DES cases and later DES cases,
and was subsequently a factor considered in the extension of the
doctrine to other products.3 8 6 Critics of the MSL theory in the DES
context objected to the theory based on the difficulties defining the
relevant market and determining the market shares of defendants.38 7
The determination of the relevant market is significant because
Sindell never laid down a rule and liability could potentially change
based on the use of a broad market over a narrow market.38 Even if
the parties can agree upon a market, determining defendants' shares
of the markets in the DES context was extremely difficult because of
a lack of accurate records regarding this information. 3 89
Determining the relevant market is also a heady task in the
Kivalina context. 39 0 While the debate in the DES context was over a
local or national market, 39 1 in the climate change context the debate
would be whether to use a national or international market. The basis
of defendants' liability is their emission of greenhouse gases, i.e.,
their contribution to the overall risk of injury of plaintiffs. The reason
the court assigned a national market, or the broader market, in the
DES context in Hymowitz is because the culpability of manufacturers
was measured by the defendants' level of risk to the public at
384. See supra notes 10 1-102 and accompanying text.
385. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
386. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 242-248 and accompanying text.
388. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
389. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
390. This task is made simpler because, unlike DES which was sold for many
purposes, CO 2 emissions combine to cause the same common result. See supra note
244 and accompanying text.
391. See supra notes 188-189 and accompanying text.
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large. 392 In the climate change context the "risk of harm" is more
than a risk. There is no question that defendants have contributed to
the harm suffered.3 9 3 Defendants have emitted greenhouse gases,
which have caused coastal erosion harming plaintiffs.3 94 There is
documented data verifying the percentage of the CO 2 national market
emitted by the sectors represented as defendants in Kivalina.395
Commentators may argue, and would likely succeed in suggesting,
that an international market (the broader market in climate change
litigation) is appropriate because climate change is a global
phenomenon, with all contributions globally combining to result in
plaintiffs' harm. In such circumstances, there are workable solutions
to the potential jurisdictional and arbitrariness problems posed by use
of an international market. First, based on studies of historical
responsibility for CO 2 emissions between 1900 and 1999, the United
States, Europe, and a combination of China, India, and other
developing parts of Asia, are responsible for 30%, 27%, and 12% of
total global emissions respectively. 396 In the European Union
countries and the United States, 73% and 81% of CO 2 emissions,
respectively, are attributable to the industry, energy, and
transportation sectors. 3 97 There is significant data suggesting market
concentration in the United States among fossil fuel and electricity
sectors. 398 If such a concentration exists among European sectors, as
is suggested at least in the electricity sector, 399 then the group of
defendants joined would be manageable there as well. For

392. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 7, 14-18 and accompanying text.
394. See supranotes 108-109 and accompanying text.
395. See supranotes 14-18 and accompanying text.
396. WORLD RES. INST., EarthTrends: The Environmental Information Portal,
http://earthtrends.wri.org (follow "Climate and Atmosphere" hyperlink; then follow
"Maps" hyperlink; then follow "Contributions to Global Warming") (last visited
Mar. 23, 2011).
397. Compare Kysar, supra note 101, at 19, with EU Energy in Figures2010,
EUROPEAN COMM'N DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR ENERGY AND TRANSPORTATION

3 (Jan. 26, 2010), http://ec.europa.eu/energy/publications/doc/
statistics/ext co2 emissions by sector.pdf.
398. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
399. See Marc-Kevin Codognet et. al., Mergers and Acquisitions in the European
Electricity Sector, Cases and Patterns, Centre D'Economie Industrielle 128-31
figs.6 & 7 (Sept. 23, 2002), http://www.cema.ensmp.fr/Documents/FL-MAMAsEU.pdf.
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jurisdiction purposes, most of the companies joined in Kivalina are
international companies with offices worldwide.4 0 0
This fact
suggests that at least some of the companies joined internationally
would be subject to suit in the United States and plaintiffs in
Kivalina, or similar cases, could join an international market.
Plaintiffs also are not required to join the entire international
market. Plaintiffs may choose to sue only defendants who represent
the thirty percent U.S. share of the international market.401 This
would avoid any jurisdictional and manageability problems an
international market presents. However, should plaintiffs decide to
join only national defendants they would then only recover from that
thirty percent pool of the international market. Defendants' shares in
the national market may be used to allocate liability based within the
U.S.'s thirty percent segment of the international market.
Thus, regardless of whether plaintiffs join members of the
international market, or simply deduct from their recovery those
defendants not joined, an international market, the broader choice of
market as in Hymowitz, should be used in climate change cases. The
market shares should be easily determined based on the volume of
defendants' greenhouse gas emissions. Having met the practical
requirements of Sindell, this Note will now discuss the best model of
MSL to use in climate change litigation.
D. Hymowitz As the AppropriateModel of Market Share Liabilityfor
Kivalina
Because the Sindell policy justifications support climate change
cases and the Sindell requirements are met, this section now
examines which model of MSL is appropriate in the context of

400. See supra note 101.
401. See supra note 396 and accompanying text. A reduced recovery is not ideal
for plaintiffs. It is possible that because defendants' liability is based on their risk
of harm, or actual harm, to plaintiffs, defendants should cover 100 percent of the
national market, or the narrow market as in Martin v. Abbott Labs. See supra notes
176-179 and accompanying text. However, because MSL measures culpability
based on volume of emissions it would be unfair to inflate the shares of defendants
by using a national market in what is clearly a global phenomenon. The best option
for Kivalina plaintiffs is to join defendants from other high-emission countries for a
more complete recovery.
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climate change. This section submits that the MSL model promoted
in Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.402 is ideal.
First, as previously discussed, the broader choice of market, as in
Hymowitz is preferable to a local market. 4 03 Based on the nature of
global warming it would be inequitable to require defendants to cover
injuries based on a national market.404 Next, in Hymowitz, the court
declined to allow defendants to exculpate themselves from liability
because their culpability was based on the overall risk the defendants
produced.4 05 Exculpation should similarly be disallowed in the
context of climate change litigation because all defendants joined
who emit greenhouse gases have, in fact, contributed to plaintiffs'
harm.
Finally, the court in Hymowitz held that liability was several
only.406 The court found it unfair to hold any defendant liable for any
larger amount than their market share, or their "fair share of
responsibility." 4 07 Other courts in the DES context had held that
defendants were required to cover 100% of the market to give
408
plaintiffs a full recovery. Under that approach the market shares of
the remaining defendants are adjusted after exculpation to ensure that
100% of the market is covered and plaintiffs obtain a complete
recovery. 409 The Hymowitz court found this proposal to be unfair and
determined that in cases where not all manufacturers are joined,
defendants are still only responsible for their market share, resulting
in a reduced recovery for plaintiffs.4 1 0
Because joining all potential climate change defendants is nearly
impossible, even if limited to a national market, it would be unfair
and excessive to force defendants who are joined in a lawsuit to cover
Defendants are not
the market shares of missing defendants.
identified individually under the traditional tort requirement,
therefore, it is equitable to limit their liability to the harm they have
contributed to avoid concerns about excessive liability.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.

See generally supra Part II.D.
See supra Part III.C.3.
See supra Part III.C.3.
See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
See cases cited supra note 177 and accompanying text.
See cases cited supra note 177 and accompanying text.
See supra note 189.
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E. Policy Critiques of an Extension ofMarket Share Liability to

Kivalina
Having decided that the Hymowitz model of MSL is appropriate for
use in the climate change context, this section will now address
critiques of MSL raised in the DES and post-DES cases likely to be
raised in the climate change context: the abandonment of traditional
tort principles, that climate change is better suited for the legislature,
federal preemption, and the social cost of imposing liability.
1. Too Far from Existing Tort Principles
Critics in the DES context argued that the application of MSL
would cause too great a deviation from existing tort principles by
holding blameless defendants liable. 411 This concern is unjustified in
the climate change context because as greenhouse gas emitters, each
defendant has in fact contributed to plaintiffs' harm. 412 Additionally,
the use of several liability will ensure that defendants will only pay
for the emissions they contributed, and therefore the harm they
caused.4 1 3 For the same reasons the critique that defendants might
become insurers of their industry414 is unjustified. Defendants are
only paying for their contribution to the harm based on the volume of
their emissions. Defendants are not responsible for the emissions of
other defendants not parties to the action, and therefore they are not
insurers of the entire industry.
2. Political Question
A critique not fully developed in the DES context but raised in the
climate change context in both AEP and Kivalina is that recovery
surrounding climate change involves determinations of policy and
therefore that the legislature is better suited to fashion resolutions of
this kind. This critique is arguably valid in cases like AEP where
plaintiffs seek injunctive remedies.4 1 5 The political question critique
does not apply to cases like Kivalina where plaintiffs seek damages
411. See supra notes 198, 201, 228-29 and accompanying text; see also supra
note 115 (noting that Kivalina plaintiffs are almost entirely blameless).
412. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
413. See supra notes 186-187 and accompanying text.
414. See supra notes 197, 230 and accompanying text.
415. See supra notes 334-339 and accompanying text.
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for past harms.416 In nuisance cases where damages are sought
through the special standing requirement, a less stringent standard is
417
applied because there is no implication that the activity will cease.
Where there is no suggestion that defendants must stop or limit their
emissions, plaintiffs' request for damages, a classic tort remedy for
past harms, cannot be deemed to be a political question simply
because the harms resulted from contributions to global warming.
3. Preemption
Another potential critique is that the CAA has precluded judicial
action. Nevertheless, at this point, the EPA is authorized under the
CAA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, but has not yet done
so.418 In DES and post-DES cases courts were reluctant to allow the
application of MSL where Congress had enacted comprehensive
legislation providing a remedy for potential plaintiffs. 4 1 9 No such
legislation has been enacted for plaintiffs with monetizeable harms
resulting from climate change. Additionally, regulatory legislation
regarding levels of emissions is not the type of remedial legislation
described in the post-DES cases.420 Even if Congress passed
legislation regulating levels of emissions, that legislation still would
not provide a remedy for the past harms in the Kivalina case.
4. Social Cost
The final and most significant critique is how liability will affect
the social utility of the defendant power and electric companies. This
critique is similar to the policy of encouraging scientific development
in the DES and post-DES context.421 It is true that defendant
companies provide an enormous social utility through their
production of energy and provision of fossil fuels to the world. The
loss of these products would drastically damage the American and
global economies. Therefore, critics may argue that imposing
liability on defendants would have impermissible effects on a socially
useful service.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.

See supra Part III.A.3.
See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 292-296 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 292-296 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 134, 286-291 and accompanying text.
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First, this critique is cabined by the remedy sought by plaintiffs. In
nuisance cases like Kivalina, where plaintiffs meet the special injury
standing requirement422 and are able to request damages,423 the
objectionable activity is permitted to continue. Therefore, if the court
were to hold the Kivalina defendants liable under MSL they would
still be able to provide their socially useful service while
compensating plaintiffs for their loss.
Critics may argue that imposing liability on these companies even
in the form of damages would harm their social utility by forcing
them to pass costs onto consumers or even by forcing them into
bankruptcy.424 This critique is not dispositive both on a narrow level
relating only to the Kivalina litigation and on a broad level relating to
litigation of this type. First, narrowly, the Kivalina defendants are
some of the most profitable companies in the world.4 25 The cost of
relocating the village split amongst them would not be significant
enough to pass on to consumers or force the companies into
bankruptcy as suggested by critics of MSL.4 26
Broadly, recovery of this type will be narrowly limited to
particularized factual circumstances because both the limitations on
applying MSL 427 and the requirements for special injury standing in a
public
public nuisance suit apply.428 In order to obtain damages in a 429
To
standing.
injury
special
have
must
plaintiffs
nuisance suit,
achieve this standing, plaintiffs must prove they have suffered harm
distinct from harm suffered by the community at large. 430 Therefore,
by virtue of seeking damages, plaintiffs are restricted from claiming
future damage, seeking abatement, or using harm to the environment
in general to show special injury. 43 1 This means that even if the AEP
plaintiffs sought damages, their claim would fail because they have
422. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (noting special injury is
obtained where plaintiff experienced damage to property or purely economic
losses); see also supra notes 110, 113-114 (explaining Kivalina's injury as damage
to property and monetary losses for relocation).
423. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
424. See supra notes 231-234 and accompanying text.
425. See supra note 101.
426. See supra notes 231-234 and accompanying text.
427. See supra Part III.C; see also notes 218-221 & Part II.E.
428. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
429. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
430. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
431. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
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not proved a harm distinct from that of the general public. 4 32
Because special injury standing is difficult to prove in climate change
cases, only very few nuisance cases, like Kivalina, will be able to
proceed and warrant the application of MSL. Therefore, the concern
of critics that liability will be crippling is unfounded and should not
bar climate change cases from utilizing MSL.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs in Kivalina face significant obstacles in succeeding
on the merits of their public nuisance claims, including succeeding on
their pending appeal regarding standing and political question. This
Note suggested that the Kivalina plaintiffs may be able to proceed
with their claims after a broad Supreme Court ruling in AEP, limiting
climate change nuisance claims seeking injunctions. Nevertheless,
plaintiffs still face an uphill battle, particularly in the area of
causation.
This Note proposed a potential framework for plaintiffs to satisfy
one element of causation, the identification requirement, through
MSL. This Note discussed the policy behind allowing MSL, the
practical requirements, which limit significantly the scope of the rule,
and the policy critiques against applying MSL in a variety of
contexts.
This Note concluded by suggesting that MSL is appropriate for use
by Kivalina plaintiffs, and others similarly situated, to recover
damages in a climate change public nuisance suit. Specifically,
where the Sindell policy justifications apply, and the practical
requirements-fungibility, plaintiffs' inability to identify the
responsible defendant, and the determination of an appropriate and
usable market, here an international market-are met the use of MSL
in climate change nuisance suits is appropriate. Finally, this Note
recognized that because the policy critiques against extending the use
of MSL do not apply in the Kivalina context, plaintiffs are not barred
from using MSL and in doing so achieving a classic tort goal of
balancing victim compensation with the social utility of defendants'
activity.
432. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. States may argue that their
specific coastlines are affected uniquely, thus they have suffered special injury.
Nevertheless, the states in Connecticut represent the interests of seventy-seven
million people, a number large enough to potentially serve as the general public.

